Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Public Comments on VVSG 2.0 Principles and Guidelines

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Verified Voting is pleased to see the VVSG 2.0 principles and guidelines finally moving forward. We are enthusiastic about the VVSG 2.0 structure and, with some reservations, about the content of the principles and guidelines. Full implementation of the VVSG 2.0 will, in time, help bring about voting systems that set new standards for universal usability, security, and verifiability. All these properties – backed by sound procedures – are essential to enable officials to run resilient elections, and to reassure voters that their votes have been cast as intended and counted as cast.

We urge the EAC to allow the technical requirements and test assertions to be approved and revised without a vote of the commissioners. We agree with the TGDC, the NASED executive council, and others that for several reasons, these documents are best managed by technical staff, adhering to a well-defined process with broad consultation and opportunity for public comment.

Verification and the VVSG

Verified Voting especially welcomes Principle 9, which stipulates that a voting system “is auditable and enables evidence-based elections,” and the associated guidelines. No matter how otherwise usable and reliable a voting system may be, it is unacceptably dangerous if it cannot provide trustworthy, software-independent evidence that people’s votes have been accurately recorded and counted.

A voting system alone can “enable” evidence-based elections but cannot provide them. As Philip Stark and David Wagner wrote in their seminal paper, the basic equation is that “evidence = auditability + auditing.” A voting system with a voter-verifiable audit trail, such as a voter-marked paper ballot, provides auditability. Compliance audits to ensure that the audit trail is substantially complete and accurate, and risk-limiting tabulation audits of the audit trail, provide actual evidence that outcomes are correct.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Testimony before the Allegheny County Pennsylvania Board of Elections

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Thank you, Chairman Baker and members of the Board, for allowing Verified Voting to submit written testimony in connection with the Public Meeting on the Purchase of Voting Systems. We hope to provide background on the security needs that counsel for the adoption of a new voting system with a verifiable and auditable paper ballot, and provide some high-level recommendations for consideration by the Board as it deliberates the purchase of new voting equipment for Allegheny County.

The Scope of the Problems with Election Security and Current Election Infrastructure

Election administration depends on computers at multiple points in the election process. Equipment for voting is but one part of a broad array of election technology infrastructure that supports the conduct of elections today. Some of that technology infrastructure includes voter registration databases, internet facing applications such as online voter registration and polling place lookup, network connections between state government and local jurisdictions, the computers that program the voting devices that record and count votes in addition to the voting devices themselves. Some jurisdictions also use electronic poll books to check voters in at polling sites and most states and localities report election night returns via a website.

To the extent that any of these can be compromised or manipulated, can contain errors, or can fail to operate correctly—or at all—this can potentially affect the vote. Election system security requires not only efforts to prevent breaches and malfunctions, but also fail-safes that address breaches or malfunctions that do occur and procedures to confirm the correctness of election outcomes.

Media Release: Verified Voting Applauds Oregon’s Senate for Passing Bill Requiring Robust Post-Election Audits to Verify Elections

Marian K. Schneider: “Oregon is leading the way towards better integrity and security with the passage of SB 944.”

The following is a statement from Marian K. Schneider, president of Verified Voting, on Oregon’s Senate passage of SB 944, offering counties the option to audit elections using a process known as risk-limiting audits, which are designed to bolster public confidence in elections. For additional media inquiries, please contact aurora@newheightscommunications.com  

“Oregon is leading the way towards better election integrity and security with the Senate’s passage of SB 944. This bill requires county clerks across the state to conduct audits after every election — not just general elections — and lets them choose between a partial hand count and risk-limiting audits (RLAs). An RLA examines a sample of the paper ballots to check if the election outcome is correct.  RLAs provide strong evidence when election outcomes are correct, and have a guaranteed large chance of correcting wrong outcomes or, outcomes that are wrong because of counting errors.

Verified Voting Blog: Election Cybersecurity Legislation Hits a Wall, RobinHood Visits Baltimore, and of course Florida

“According to a joint report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and IT industry professional association ACS, one in five national elections held worldwide since 2016 were potentially influenced by foreign interference, … “Democracies around the world have been struggling to grapple with foreign interference from state actors during elections,” International Cyber Policy Centre head Fergus Hanson said. “More empirical data means they can respond in a more targeted way calibrating policy responses to the likely risk, methods and adversary.” Technology Decisions

In an extensive Roll Call article this morning, Gopal Ratnam reports that despite the best intentions of election officials and many lawmakers, in 2020 many jurisdictions will be using “voting machines that are woefully outdated and that any tampering by adversaries could lead to disputed results.”

In addition to eliminating direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines and requiring routine post-election audits, many of the legislative efforts have addresses cybersecurity vulnerabilities in voting systems. Edgardo Cortés, election security advisor at the Brennan Center for Justice noted, “In some sense, anything that has an internet connection can be hacked. Wireless capability, even if the functionality can be turned off through hardware or software, poses risks of remote access by adversaries, he said.”

Verified Voting President Marian Schneider explained inthe article that beyond prohibiting voting equipment that can connect to the internet, “machines may still need to have some type of wireless communication system so that administrators can upload new ballot information ahead of each election. Some counties and precincts insert manual cartridges into machines to upload ballot information, but others push out that information wirelessly because it’s easier.”

“The software on new models of voting machines would also need routine updates, and that would require some type of connectivity,” Schneider continued, “the question is, how you do it safely? Because we can’t reduce the risk to zero, we need to do audits to check the results after. Post-election audits, in which samples of cast paper ballots are recounted, is considered the gold standard for verifying election results, but few states conduct them.”

Verified Voting Blog: Counting Votes: Paper Ballots and Audits in Congress, Crisis at the EAC?, Florida’s Mystery Counties

In her testimony at an election security hearing before the Committee on House Administration last week, Verified Voting President Marian Schneider joined advocates and election officials in calling on Congress to help states and local jurisdictions replace aging voting systems, conduct risk-limiting audits and enhance election infrastructure security. In order to prepare for 2020, Congress must provide “adequate financial investment in cyber security best practices, replacement equipment and post-election audit processes … immediately and continue at a sustainable level moving forward.”

Writing in Governing, Graham Vyse highlighted the significant bipartisan agreement between the two secretaries of state who testified, Jocelyn Benson (D-MI) and John Merrill (R-AL), on efforts needed to address emerging threats to election security. Significantly, the state election officials, along with all the witnesses, were unanimous in recommending the replacement of direct recording electronic voting machines with paper ballot voting systems and conducting post-election ballot audits.

Two days after the hearing, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie Thompson (D-MS), House Administration Committee Chairwoman Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) and Rep. John Sarbanes (D-MD), the chairman of the Democracy Reform Task Forcereintroduced The Election Security Act. Aimed at reducing risks posed by cyberattacks by foreign entities or other actors against U.S. election systems, the bill would establish cybersecurity standards for voting system vendors and require states to use paper ballots during elections.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Letter in Support of Congressional Election Cybersecurity Legislation

This letter was sent to Senators Cory Gardner (R-CO), Mark Warner (D-VA) and Representatives Derek Kilmer (D-WA) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) on May 14, 2019. Download the PDF. Thank you for introducing legislation aimed at increasing cybersecurity at the state and local levels of government. We recognize the need for this important legislation, which is aimed at hardening cyber resiliency efforts and preventing vulnerabilities from becoming nightmare realities. For the states that would respond to the proposed grants in H.R. 2130 and S.1065, and for the protection of the citizens who live in them, we applaud your support in the battle against cyberattacks. At the same time that you are bolstering cybersecurity defenses, we encourage you to add provisions specifically prohibiting these funds from being used for internet-based voting. Cybersecurity experts agree that internet return of marked ballots lacks sufficient safeguards for security and privacy. We urge you to specifically name internet voting as a threat and prohibit the funding provided by your legislation from being used to support internet voting programs and pilots. Cybersecurity experts agree that no current technology, including blockchain voting, can guarantee the secure, verifiable, and private return of voted ballots over the internet. Both because vote-rigging malware could already be present on the voter's computer and because electronically returned ballots could be intercepted and changed or discarded en route, local elections officials would be unable to verify that the voter’s ballot accurately reflects the voter’s intent. Furthermore, even if the voter's selections were to arrive intact, the voted ballot could be traceable back to the individual voter, violating voter privacy.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Testimony Before the House Administration Committee hearing on “Election Security"

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Chair Lofgren, Ranking Member Davis and members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to submit testimony to the Committee on House Administration hearing on “Election Security.” We urge the Committee to move expeditiously to support state and local jurisdictions in strengthening their election systems and provide upfront and sustained investment in election infrastructure and security. Since 2016, it is clear that the threat to our democratic institution of voting is not theoretical, but real and persistent. We must, as a nation, adopt the clear solutions that will allow us to defuse the destructive narrative of election hacking that undermines the very fabric of our democracy.
The Scope of the Problems with Election Security and Current Election Infrastructure
Election administration depends on computers at multiple points in the election process. Equipment for voting is but one part of a broad array of election technology infrastructure that supports the conduct of elections today. Some of that technology infrastructure includes voter registration databases, internet facing applications such as online voter registration and polling place lookup, network connections between state government and local jurisdictions, the computers that program the voting devices that record and count votes in addition to the voting devices themselves. Some jurisdictions also use electronic poll books to check voters in at polling sites and most states and localities report election night returns via a website.
To the extent that any of these can be compromised or manipulated, can contain errors, or can fail to operate correctly—or at all—this can potentially affect the vote. Election system security requires not only efforts to prevent breaches and malfunctions, but also fail-safes that address breaches and malfunctions that do occur.

Verified Voting Blog: Counting Votes May 16 2019

In her testimony at an election security hearing before the Committee on House Administration last week, Verified Voting President Marian Schneider joined advocates and election officials in calling on Congress to help states and local jurisdictions replace aging voting systems, conduct risk-limiting audits and enhance election infrastructure security. In order to prepare for 2020, Congress must provide “adequate financial investment in cyber security best practices, replacement equipment and post-election audit processes … immediately and continue at a sustainable level moving forward.”

Writing in Governing, Graham Vyse highlighted the significant bipartisan agreement between the two secretaries of state who testified, Jocelyn Benson (D-MI)and John Merrill (R-AL) on efforts needed to address emerging threats to election security. Along with all the witnesses, the state election officials agreed that more federal funding for election security was needed. Significantly the witnesses were also unanimous in recommending the replacement of direct recording electronic voting machines with paper ballot voting system and conducting post-election ballot audits.

Two days after the hearing, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie Thompson (D-MS), House Administration Committee Chairwoman Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) and Rep. John Sarbanes (D-MD), the chairman of the Democracy Reform Task Force reintroduced The Election Security Act. Aimed at reducing risks posed by cyberattacks by foreign entities or other actors against U.S. election systems, the bill would establish cybersecurity standards for voting system vendors and require states to use paper ballots during elections.

The resignation of the Election Assistance Commission’s head of voting system testing and certification reflects an agency crisis according to Politico’s Morning Cybersecurity. Macias’ departure may be related to an exchange  at an EAC field hearing, when Commissioner Christy McCormick repeatedly asked Macias why EAC commissioners didn’t have final approval over the details of federal voting system standards. After Macias leaves on May 17, the EAC will have only one employee working full-time on assessing voting machines based on federal standards former Colorado voting security expert Jerome Lovato, who, according to an email obtained by CyberScoop, the EAC has appointed Lovato to replace Macias. The EAC’s internal announcement cited Lovato’s experience testing and piloting voting systems and his familiarity with risk-limiting audits. He previously worked for a decade as a voting systems specialist at the Colorado Secretary of State’s office.

Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) has contacted VR Systems, the Florida voter-registration software maker that the FBI apparently believes Russia hacked, asking if “the company ever engaged a third party to conduct a forensic examination of its computer networks and systems since the hacking assertions first came to light after the 2016 election”. As Kim Zetter reports in Politico, VR Systems, insists it wasn’t hacked, referencing an analysis by FireEye to claim there was never an intrusion in VR System’s EVID servers or network. A separate FBI investigation indicated that malware was installed on the network of a vendor fitting VR Systems’ description.

After a briefing last Friday with the FBI and DHS, Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, revealed that, according to the Müller investigation, election information in two Florida counties was accessed by Russian hackers in 2016.

Verified Voting Blog: Statement on Maryland HB706/SB919 Online Delivery and Marking of Absentee Ballots

To download the PDF click here.

Verified Voting supports Maryland House Bill 706 (Senate Bill 919) as an immediate, short-term mitigation to reduce risks inherent in Maryland’s current online absentee ballot system by limiting its use to only those who would otherwise be unable to vote. Going forward, substantial changes are necessary to provide Maryland’s voters with secure, reliable, accessible means of voting absentee.

Verified Voting supports the objective of helping voters to obtain their ballots and cast their votes, but any technology used for this purpose must be carefully evaluated. Regrettably, computer scientists and others have found that Maryland’s system has several grave shortcomings.

Because Maryland does not check signatures on returned absentee ballots, there is no way to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate ballots. Using information that is widely available, an attacker could readily request, electronically receive (at multiple fake email addresses), and cast any number of absentee ballots.[1.This information includes personal identifiers that in principle are private, but in practice can be inexpensively purchased in bulk.] Even if the attacker did not cast the ballots, any voters purported to have requested absentee ballots would be required to cast provisional ballots, creating chaos and suspicion and increasing the likelihood that the voter will be disenfranchised.

Media Release: Verified Voting Applauds Rep. Daryl Metcalfe, Rep. Garth Everett and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer’s Nonpartisan Call for the Penn. General Assembly to Appropriate Funding to Replace Vulnerable Electronic Voting Machines

Marian K. Schneider: “Election security is a nonpartisan issue and the goal of hardening our voting systems against potential threats is shared across the aisle.”

The following is a statement from Marian K. Schneider, president of Verified Voting, formerly Deputy Secretary for Elections and Administration in the Pennsylvania Department of State, following the press conference with Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer this morning in Harrisburg, PA. Lt. Col. Shaffer also testified during the Senate Committee on State Government Hearing on Senate Bill 48 this morning.

“Verified Voting applauds Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer’s testimony this morning urging Pennsylvania to replace all paperless DREs and for underscoring that this is a cybersecurity threat that needs to be addressed. The Pennsylvania legislature needs to appropriate additional funding to reimburse counties for the cost of replacing aging and vulnerable electronic voting machines with ones that have a voter-marked paper ballot of votes cast before the 2020 election.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Statement on EAC Chair Christy McCormick

The following is a statement from Verified Voting's president, Marian K. Schneider:

"Verified Voting congratulates Christy McCormick on her election as Chair of the Election Assistance Commission and her three priorities for her tenure: election preparedness, replacing aging voting equipment, and working towards improving accessibility for all voters including voters with disabilities, military and overseas voters and limited English proficient voters.

"With those laudable goals in mind, Verified Voting urges Christy McCormick and the EAC to ensure that the next generation of voting systems provide most voters the opportunity to mark their ballots by hand and support robust post-election tabulation audits. These post-election audits can protect the integrity of the election outcomes with the existing systems.Technology has evolved so that improved security, verifiability and accessibility are not mutually exclusive, but can give everyone, the candidates, voters, the press and the public assurance that our voting system is resilient against attack."

Pennsylvania: Controversy swirls around new Philadelphia city voting system | WHYY

Philadelphia’s three city commissioners, who run local elections, may announce the selection of a new voting system as soon as Wednesday, and it may leave some disappointed. “We’re worried the city commissioners are going to pick a voting system that is not only very expensive, but not a good system for security,” said Rich Garella of the group Citizens for Better Elections. “It has poor access for disabled people. It’s a bad choice.” The state is requiring all counties to get new voting machines this year that generate paper ballot backups. City commissioners are mum about what kind of voting system they might recommend at their Wednesday meeting, but Garella and State Auditor General Eugene DePasquale said the city’s selection process seems tilted toward a particular system and a single vendor. … That vendor is Omaha-based Election Systems & Software, known as ES&S, the largest manufacturer of voting systems in the country. The ES&S Express Vote XL system is the only one sold in the U.S. that shows voters all candidates for all races on one electronic screen.

National: Where cybersecurity legislation ‘goes to die’ in Congress | Politico

Wisconsin Republican Sen. Ron Johnson leads the committee with broad oversight over the nation’s most important cybersecurity issues, including protecting consumers and U.S. elections from hackers. But he’s also a major reason little legislation on these topics ever passes, according to lobbyists, cybersecurity policy experts, lawmakers and congressional aides from both parties who spoke with POLITICO. Johnson or members of his staff have derailed many of the most significant cybersecurity-related bills in the past four years, including legislation to secure elections, study whether the growing use of encrypted apps hampers law enforcement, and hold companies accountable for the proliferation of insecure connected devices, people who track the legislation told POLITICO.

National: Supreme Court likely to act this week on census dispute | Constitution Daily

Moving with unusual speed, the Supreme Court on Monday set the stage for acting soon – probably on Friday – on the constitutional controversy over asking everyone living in America about their citizenship, as part of the 2020 census. At issue at this point is whether the Justices will take up directly, without waiting for further action in lower courts, the dispute over the contents of the questionnaire that will go to every household across the nation next year. The outcome of the controversy may have a major influence on dividing up seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, on drawing up new election district maps at all levels of government, and about the distribution of billions of dollars in federal money. Although there is a clear dispute among the two sides in the controversy about the legality of adding the citizenship question, everyone involved has now agreed that an answer needs to be forthcoming before the Supreme Court finishes its current term, probably in late June.

California: Amendment would lower California voting age from 18 to 17 | The Sacramento Bee

A state lawmaker from the Silicon Valley has reintroduced a constitutional amendment that would lower the California voting age to 17, betting that a larger Democratic majority in the Legislature this year will help his proposal reach the ballot. An amendment requires the approval of two-thirds of the state Assembly and Senate, and the approval of voters. Last year, a similar proposal from Democratic Assemblyman Evan Low of Campbell failed to reach the necessary margin of 46-24. This time around, there are more Democrats in the Assembly, Low spokeswoman Maya Polon said, adding that the legislation enjoys bipartisan support.

Georgia: New Analysis Suggests Link Between Race And Odd Vote Count In Georgia’s 2018 Midterms | WABE

A new data analysis suggests the sharp drop in votes in the lieutenant governor’s election last year may be connected to the race of voters. The finding raised more questions about the results of the down-ballot contest in which Republican Geoff Duncan handily defeated Democrat Sarah Riggs Amico. Compared to the governor’s race between Democrat Stacey Abrams and Republican Brian Kemp, about 160,000 fewer votes were cast in the lieutenant governor’s contest, while just 82,000 fewer votes were cast in the attorney general’s contest.

Idaho: Lawmakers agree to temporary truce on redistricting plan | Associated Press

Lawmakers say they are working on an agreement involving an impasse on legislation that could lead to changing the Idaho Constitution involving redistricting that Republicans want but Democrats oppose. Republican and Democratic leaders on Monday said they are talking, and that was enough for Democrats not to use procedural rules to slow down progress in the House by forcing the full reading of bills as they did on Friday.

Indiana: Johnson County to change election equipment before May Primary | FOX59

The Johnson County Election Board and Commissioners are cutting ties with software vendor that caused system crashes which resulted in thousands of voters waiting in lines for hours during the November 6 election. The Johnson County Commissioners voted Monday to adopt Election Board recommendations that the county terminate its contract with Omaha-based Election Systems and Software. “We just want to ensure that we have a good election,” said Johnson County Clerk Trena McGlaughlin.  “We don’t want to have any issues this year.  And we want to make everyone happy.” An investigation by Ball State’s VSTOP team, for the Indiana Secretary of State, determined ES&S systems were not properly set up for the high voter turnout the county saw on election day.  A system slow-down quickly brought voting to a standstill at multiple voting sites across the county.  Thousands of voters were left waiting in line for several hours as election officials and technical advisors struggled to get e-poll books back up to speed.

Iowa: Democrats Propose `Virtual’ Caucuses for First Time in 2020 | Bloomberg

Democratic leaders in Iowa on Monday proposed a major change in the state’s presidential caucuses by allowing a form of absentee voting next year that aims to expand participation in the first 2020 nominating contest. It would let Iowa Democrats take part via telephone or online in one of six "virtual caucuses" during the week before the traditional Iowa caucuses. That would allow people to get involved even if they can’t attend the traditional gatherings in person because of a disability, work, parenting or another reason. If adopted it “will be the most significant changes to the Iowa Democratic Party caucuses since their inception in 1972,” Troy Price, the state party’s chairman, told reporters on a conference call.

Nevada: Republicans seek to tighten election rules | Las Vegas Review-Journal

A series of Republican-sponsored bills seek to tighten rules on elected officials running for another office and for minor-party office seekers who switch parties to run. A third item would make the registrar of voters in the state’s two largest counties, Washoe and Clark, an elected rather than appointed post. All three measures were heard Monday by the Senate Committee on Legislative Operations and Elections, which did not vote on them. A “resign-to-run” measure would require elected officeholders to resign their current office if they announce candidacy for a different elected office more than a year before their current term ends. They would be resigned automatically if they don’t resign on their own. Resulting vacancies would be filled under current procedures for vacant seats.

North Carolina: There’s at least one special election coming to North Carolina soon | Roll Call

The death of North Carolina Rep. Walter B. Jones over the weekend opens up a safe Republican seat on the state’s east coast. The governor must call a special election for the 3rd District. But there is no statutory time frame, so the timing will be up to Democratic Gov. Roy Cooper. Further west, in the 9th District, voters are still waiting to hear whether there will be a special election for the vacant seat — the results of the 2018 election between Republican Mark Harris and Democrat Dan McCready have not been certified. The North Carolina State Board of Elections is holding an evidentiary hearing on allegations of election fraud on Feb. 18.

Editorials: As a Citizen Included on Texas’ Fake Voter Fraud List, I Call for the Resignation of Secretary of State David Whitley | Julieta Garibay/Texas Observer

I still remember the day of my citizenship exam. It was a cold Monday in November 2017, at the San Antonio office of U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS). I had relentlessly studied the 100 questions about the history and government of the United States that might be asked. I prayed I wouldn’t forget the answers. My heart was pounding and my stomach was in a complete knot. The USCIS agent asked: “Who is the governor of Texas?” “Abbott,” I responded. The officer sternly asked for the governor’s full name. My mind was running. A few months before, I had tweeted at Abbott when he signed SB 4 on Facebook and proudly boasted about criminalizing immigrants and making it easier for state and local police to work with the feds to detain and deport. But I could not remember his first name. I froze. The irony of my life: Would I fail my citizenship exam because I couldn’t remember the first name of the man who was hurting the immigrant community so much? The same man who is now calling into question my right to vote. I took a deep breath, closed my eyes and tried to remember his Twitter handle. It came to me and I blurted, “Greg Abbott!” A few questions later, the USCIS officer said, “I am recommending you for the citizenship oath ceremony.”

Bulgaria: Deputy PM: Bulgaria must be ready for malicious cyber attacks in elections | IBNA

Bulgaria must be ready for malicious cyber attacks, Deputy Prime Minister Tomislav Donchev said on February 11, warning that there was no election process exempt from attempts to "hit" it. Election processes are within Donchev's portfolio as deputy head of government. Bulgaria is scheduled to go to the polls twice in 2019, in European Parliament elections in May and mayoral and municipal elections in the autumn. Donchev's comment came a day after Tsvetan Tsvetanov, parliamentary leader of Prime Minister Boiko Borissov's centre-right GERB party, said that he was sure that Russia would try to interfere in Bulgaria's elections this year.

Nigeria: Election Brings Dual Crises Back to the Polls: Corruption and Boko Haram | The New York Times

Muhammadu Buhari won the presidency in a historic election in Nigeria four years ago by promising to crush two scourges that had plagued the nation for years: endemic corruption and a war with Islamist extremists. Back then, Mr. Buhari, a former military general, rode a wave of voter desire to impose greater accountability on the government, end a brutal war with the extremist group Boko Haram and bring back the hundreds of female students taken as captives. Now, as Mr. Buhari is in the final throes of a bruising re-election campaign, he stands accused of falling short on all fronts. Critics say Mr. Buhari has used his antigraft mantra to crush adversaries. Boko Haram is gaining ground, launching sophisticated attacks on weary, underequipped soldiers. And many of the captive students are still missing.

Russia: Russia to disconnect from the internet as part of a planned test | ZDNet

Russian authorities and major internet providers are planning to disconnect the country from the internet as part of a planned experiment, Russian news agency RosBiznesKonsalting (RBK) reported last week. The reason for the experiment is to gather insight and provide feedback and modifications to a proposed law introduced in the Russian Parliament in December 2018. A first draft of the law mandated that Russian internet providers should ensure the independence of the Russian internet space (Runet) in the case of foreign aggression to disconnect the country from the rest of the internet.

Spain: Premier Running Out of Options Amid Reports of Snap Vote | Bloomberg

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s budget plans are threatening to unravel amid reports that he’s considering calling a snap election for April. After his conservative rivals staged a show of strength by bringing tens of thousands of demonstrators onto the streets of Madrid, Efe news agency reported that Sanchez is considering calling elections for April 14. A press officer for the premier said the government is focused on getting its budget passed this week. Protesters in the heart of the Spanish capital on Sunday were demanding an election and accused the prime minister of being soft in talks with Catalan separatists. They waved Spanish flags and shouted "Long Live the Constitution, Long Live Spain."

Switzerland: Left behind and locked out of Swiss democracy | SWI

Democracy bases its legitimacy on the promise to adequately and appropriately represent the population. However, a look at Switzerland’s system reveals some shortcomings: women, young people, foreigners and the low-qualified are often absent from political institutions. Democratic rights don’t fall from the sky. They are the achievement of brave people who demanded and fought for political rights for themselves and for their fellow citizens. Such efforts fighting for equality were also seen in Switzerland. Almost 100 years ago, the social and political situation in the country was explosive, and many were dissatisfied with living and working conditions; factory workers, in particular, felt politicians had abandoned them.

Ukraine: Ukraine wins fight to exclude Russian election observers | KyivPost

Ukraine looks to have faced down both the Kremlin and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe over the issue of Russian election observers at its presidential election in March. The OSCE was forced to change stance after Ukraine adamantly refused to accept Russian observers of the March 31 vote, and its parliament on Feb. 7 passed a law banning them from being accredited to the OSCE mission. The Russian Foreign Ministry announced a day later that Russia had decided not to send its observers to Ukraine. And the OSCE, while expressing regret over the Ukrainian authorities’ position, also backed down.

Editorials: There’s No Good Reason to Trust Blockchain Technology | Bruce Schneier/WIRED

In his 2008 white paper that first proposed bitcoin, the anonymous Satoshi Nakamoto concluded with: “We have proposed a system for electronic transactions without relying on trust.” He was referring to blockchain, the system behind bitcoin cryptocurrency. The circumvention of trust is a great promise, but it’s just not true. Yes, bitcoin eliminates certain trusted intermediaries that are inherent in other payment systems like credit cards. But you still have to trust bitcoin—and everything about it. Much has been written about blockchains and how they displace, reshape, or eliminate trust. But when you analyze both blockchain and trust, you quickly realize that there is much more hype than value. Blockchain solutions are often much worse than what they replace. First, a caveat. By blockchain, I mean something very specific: the data structures and protocols that make up a public blockchain. These have three essential elements. The first is a distributed (as in multiple copies) but centralized (as in there’s only one) ledger, which is a way of recording what happened and in what order. This ledger is public, meaning that anyone can read it, and immutable, meaning that no one can change what happened in the past.