Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Statement on Ballot Marking Devices and Risk-limiting Audits

Download the pdf here

This statement is intended to clarify Verified Voting’s position regarding the use of ballot-marking devices (BMDs) in elections, and the use of risk-limiting audits (RLAs).  It is approved by the President, Board of Directors, and Staff of Verified Voting.

Ballot-marking devices

Verified Voting believes that voters should vote on paper ballots, but we recognize an important distinction between hand-marked and machine-marked ballots. Hand-marked paper ballots are not subject to inaccuracies or manipulation from software bugs or malicious code. In contrast, machine-marked paper ballots produced using BMDs might not accurately capture voter intent if the software or ballot configuration is buggy or malicious.

Verified Voting specifically opposes the purchase and deployment of new voting systems in which all in-person voters in a polling place are expected to use BMDs. The trustworthiness of an election conducted using BMDs depends critically on how many voters actually verify their ballots, and how carefully they do it. All voters who vote on BMDs should be made aware of the importance of carefully and conscientiously verifying their ballots before casting them, and should be actively encouraged to do so. However, empirical research thus far shows that few voters using BMDs carefully verify their printed ballots. Moreover, if voters do verify BMD-marked ballots and find what they believe are discrepancies, there is no reliable way to resolve whether the voters made mistakes or the BMDs did. For these and other reasons (such as cost) Verified Voting recommends that the use of BMDs be minimized.

Verified Voting Blog: Letter to Georgia Secretary of State regarding Verified Voting’s position and involvement with risk-limiting audit pilots

The following letter was sent to Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger on December 16, 2019. The letter addresses Verified Voting’s concerns following the November 2019 election in Georgia and provides clarity on Verified Voting’s position and involvement with risk-limiting audit pilots in the state.

Download the Letter (PDF)

Dear Secretary Raffensperger,

I am writing to address a few issues that have concerned us since the November election and so that you and your staff have clarity on Verified Voting’s position.

As an initial matter, Verified Voting did not recommend that Georgia purchase all ballot marking devices for all in-person voters. We made our position clear in a letter to the co-chairs of the SAFE Commission dated January 4, 2019 attached for your reference. Verified Voting stands by its position and notes that this continues to be our recommendation for jurisdictions who are deciding what system to purchase among commercially-available voting systems. The fact that Georgia did not follow our recommendation and purchased Dominion BMDs for all in- person voters does not change our position.

Since the summer of 2019, Verified Voting has been working with the staff of the Secretary of State to implement post-election risk-limiting audits. Mark Lindeman, Director of Science & Tech Policy at Verified Voting has been the primary contact for your staff and is a subject-matter expert on RLAs. Our work with you on the implementation phase in no way endorses Georgia’s decision to move forward with BMDs instead of our prior recommendation of both hand-marked paper ballots and ballot marking devices in the polling place.

A risk-limiting audit is a tabulation audit: it uses statistical methods to provide confidence that the paper ballots were correctly tabulated. It checks only the tabulation, namely whether a full hand-count of the cast paper ballots would reveal something different than the reported outcome. It does not check — among other things — that voters actually verified their paper ballots, or that the paper ballots being tabulated are exactly those paper ballots that should be tabulated. Nor does it check whether strong chain of custody procedures, proper ballot accounting or other processes necessary to create a trustworthy record were observed. To express or imply that doing an RLA pilot demonstrates the security of the system is simply not true.

Verified Voting Blog: Letter to North Carolina Board of Elections Regarding Certification Waiver for ES&S EVS 5.2.4.0

Download the Letter (pdf)

Dear Members of the North Carolina Board of Elections,

I am writing to you in my capacity as President of Verified Voting. Please forgive the lateness of the communication as I only recently learned of your meeting today. I am writing to urge the State Board of Elections to proceed with caution and decline to waive certification requirements for the ES&S EVS 5.2.4.0 to allow Mecklenburg County to purchase uncertified ExpressVote HW2.1 ballot marking devices (“BMDs”) for all voters. Not only would such a decision run contrary to North Carolina statutory law, but the failure to carefully examine the differences between this system and the certified system could needlessly expose Mecklenburg County to increased security risks in the upcoming election. Because Mecklenburg County insists on buying computerized ballot marking devices for all voters, the increased risk to North Carolina voters is grave indeed.

As we discuss more fully below, the differences between the two systems in both software and hardware are substantial. We believe elevating the security risk is needless because Mecklenburg County has other options in two certified systems by two other vendors. Additionally, in our view, there is time for Mecklenburg to institute a more secure system in which voters primarily mark paper ballots with a pen and the county also supplies sufficient operable ballot marking devices for voters who need or wish to use them. According to the Board, a prerequisite to use of the certified ES&S system in Mecklenburg County is the use of the system in at least one precinct in the November 2019 election. That has apparently already occurred with ExpressVote HW1.0 ballot marking device. To avoid waiving any legislative requirements, Mecklenburg could institute hand-marked paper ballots that are scanned by the DS 200 and BMDs with the vendor’s existing supply of BMDs. If the vendor represents that it does not have enough systems to even supply a small number of BMDs for each precinct, the State Board of Elections should consider the vendor’s presentation of the system for certification as offered in bad faith, especially if the vendor knew it would no longer manufacture that version of its equipment and would be unable to adequately supply counties that chose it.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting staff and partners comment on California’s proposed risk-limiting audit regulations

Verified Voting Director of Science and Technology Policy Mark Lindeman and Senior Advisor Pamela Smith collaborated with the California Voter Foundation and other partners in submitting a public comment letter responding to California’s proposed risk-limiting audit regulations. Visit the California Secretary of State’s website to view the proposed regulations. Download the Letter (pdf)

Dear Secretary Padilla:

We write in response to your recent request for public comment on proposed regulations that would impact the procedures used by election officials to conduct risk-limiting audits.[1. Proposed Regulatory Action: Risk-Limiting Audits, Title 2, Division 7, Chapter 2 of California Code of Regulations. (proposed October 25, 2019) (hereinafter “proposed regulations”).]

Thank you for your office’s efforts in developing the proposed regulations. As most of us are members of the workgroup that your office convened earlier this year, we appreciate the amount of work that went into developing these proposed regulations. We especially applaud the inclusion of the provisions regarding chain of custody, certification of contest results and reporting of audit results, public education, and the requirement for posted written audit procedures.[2. Id.]

We do, however, urge four modifications to the regulations. First, the regulations appear to conflict with California law which requires that when a county conducts a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally, it must do so for each and every contest; as we discuss below, the language of the proposed regulations only requires RLAs for three contests and establishes a new auditing procedure not found in the statute. Second, we recommend that the final regulations require the Secretary to disclose the source code of the RLA software tool. Third, we urge the Secretary to ensure in the regulations that cast vote records be made publicly available online sufficient to allow the public to verify that the RLA is being conducted appropriately. Finally, we recommend that the Secretary clarify how partial RLAs will work.

Verified Voting Blog: The Role of Risk-Limiting Audits in Evidence-Based Elections

In the aftermath of the 2016 election cycle, interest in securing American elections from tampering or hacking has intensified. Given that 99% of our votes are counted by computers, and that computers are used in every aspect of the electoral process, election security is a top priority. For over a decade, Verified Voting has advocated for the widespread adoption of post-election risk-limiting audits (RLAs) alongside other best practices to facilitate a trustworthy and auditable record of votes cast.

A post-election risk-limiting audit (RLA) is one of the pillars of cyber security. In this day and age of nation state attacks on our election systems, it is very important for election systems to be resilient and provide a way for jurisdictions to identify problems and to recover from them. Security experts agree that the best method is voter-marked paper ballots (which voters choose to mark by hand or with a ballot marking device), having a deliberate and intentional step for voters to verify their ballot selections, providing a strong chain of custody of the ballots, and checking that the computers counted them correctly (RLAs).

Evidence-Based Election Ecosystem

Risk-limiting audits are one piece of the larger ecosystem of evidence-based elections that depend upon a trustworthy record to give confidence to election outcomes. There are some things that risk-limiting audits do not do. They do not tell us whether the voting system has been hacked. They do not and cannot determine whether voters actually verified their ballots. But they can detect and correct tabulation errors that could alter election outcomes — or provide strong evidence that a full hand count would yield the same outcomes.  

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting supports respectful public observation of elections

For more than a decade Verified Voting has supported and encouraged respectful public observation of the election process consistent with a state or jurisdiction’s regulations governing observers, and promoted transparency as a key element of reliable, evidence-based elections. Election observers should be free from harassment and intimidation. Observation enables parties, candidates, citizen groups and independent organizations to deploy observers to witness the electoral process without interfering with it.

Election observation offers many benefits. The presence of election observers can “build public trust in a transparent and verifiably democratic process.” Credible election observers can help ensure that procedures are correctly followed, can alert busy election officials when issues arise, and can offer recommendations that make each election better than the last one. States and localities should welcome information gathered by observers. Verified Voting has partnered with the Election Protection Coalition for many years who have also advocated for this kind of nonpartisan observation.

Verified Voting Blog: ICYMI: John Oliver Takes on Voting Machines

John Oliver took a deep dive into voting machines on the November 3, 2019 episode of “Last Week Tonight with John Oliver” and the Verified Voting team was excited to advise on the feature and provide our data from the Verifier. The 20 minute segment noted that while America’s voting systems are still vulnerable, the solution to securing our elections is surprisingly simple: voter-marked paper ballots, a strong chain of custody of those ballots, and risk limiting audits. Check out the segment here: 

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Releases Guide Comparing Available Ballot Marking Devices

Characteristics of Currently Available Ballot Marking Devices

Verified Voting Releases Guide Comparing Available Ballot Marking Devices

Today, Verified Voting published a guide comparing the features of ballot marking devices (BMDs) available in the United States: “Characteristics of Currently Available Ballot Marking Devices By Vendor.”

Download the guide here.

The guide is intended to be a useful comparison chart between the various BMD vendors and devices for informational purposes. We attempted to collect the most meaningful characteristics that would help in evaluating the differences among systems. As detailed in Verified Voting’s Policy on Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machines and Ballot Marking Devices, Verified Voting does not endorse any specific vendor or device. Check out The Verifier to see an interactive map of voting equipment in use throughout the United States.

Please send questions and feedback to voting-system-features@verifiedvoting.org.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Praises Pennsylvania’s Election Reform Package that Helps Counties Purchase Voting Machines

View the statement here: Verified Voting Statement on Election Reform Package

Marian K. Schneider: “This funding ensures the smooth transition to secure and verifiable voting systems.”

“Verified Voting is pleased with the Pennsylvania General Assembly and Gov. Tom Wolf’s commitment to an election reform package that includes funding for counties to help pay for the replacement of electronic voting systems. The passage of the legislation removes all doubt about the legal authority of the Commonwealth to issue $90 million in bond financing.

“State funding for voting system replacement will greatly reduce the budgetary strain on counties and allow them to fund staff training, poll worker training and voter education efforts, all of which are important to ensure a smooth transition. Election security is a nonpartisan issue and the goal of hardening our voting systems against potential threats is shared across the aisle. Counties’ access to these funds is what is needed to ensure a smooth transition to paper-based electronic systems and routine, robust audits.

“A significant number of Pennsylvania counties have already moved forward towards replacement and we applaud their efforts. Without voting systems that retain a voter-marked paper ballot for recounts and audits, Pennsylvania’s elections will be dogged by legitimacy questions and will be the easiest targets for motivated attackers. This legislation as a whole will make voting easier, but the replacement of voting systems will assure Pennsylvanians that they have a verifiable method of voting and their votes will be counted as cast.

Verified Voting Blog: DEFCON Voting Village Report highlights election system vulnerabilities and solutions

Verified Voting staff joined the Voting Village at the 27th annual DEFCON conference in Las Vegas in August. DEFCON brings security professionals, journalists, lawyers, researchers, and – of course – hackers under one roof at the world’s largest annual hacking convention. Since its launch in 2017, the Voting Village has served as an “open forum to identify vulnerabilities within the US election infrastructure and to consider solutions to mitigate these vulnerabilities.”

The conference addressed the risks of mobile and internet-only voting and featured a talk by Verified Voting President Marian K. Schneider cheekily titled, “If the voting machines are insecure, let’s just vote on our phones!” She outlined the risks of voting by mobile phone and noted that even voting mobile app creators are unable to guarantee that their own technology is unhackable, as demonstrated by the FBI’s investigation into a hack of the Voatz mobile voting app in West Virginia.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Urges Congress to Pass Comprehensive, Bipartisan Election Security Funding

With the 2020 election rapidly approaching, Verified Voting continues to urge Congress to pass comprehensive election security legislation and allocate adequate funding for state and local officials to make critical improvements to our country’s election infrastructure.

Congress is negotiating a spending package for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to allocate funding for states to make much-needed election security upgrades. The House approved a $600 million package in June, while late last week the Senate offered a $250 million amendment. The House and Senate will work to reconcile the final funding amount and spending parameters in a conference committee, and Verified Voting urges Congress to act quickly while crucial election security funding remains on the line.

In a statement on the Senate’s version last week, Verified Voting President Marian K. Schneider said:

“The additional $250 million in election security funding today is promising, but more is needed to help states upgrade their systems and validate the 2020 election. This amount falls short of the $600 million that passed in the House, which is much closer to meeting the need for proper investment in election security. Congress has the obligation to protect the country from threats to national security and has the opportunity to act on this nonpartisan issue – after all, everyone votes on the same equipment.

Verified Voting Blog: Election Security Experts Urge Congress for Additional Funding;  Say $250 Million in Election Security Funding is Progress, but Not Enough

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Marian K. Schneider: “Despite the progress shown today, Congress still needs to vote on bipartisan, comprehensive election security legislation to protect and ensure trustworthy elections.” 

The following is a statement from Marian K. Schneider, president of Verified Voting, on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s (R-KY) backing of an amendment that will provide another $250M to help states bolster election security on September 19, 2019. For additional media inquires, please contact aurora@newheightscommunications.com 

“The additional $250 million in election security funding today is promising, but more is needed to help states upgrade their systems and validate the 2020 election. This amount falls short of the $600 million that passed in the House, which is much closer to meeting the need for proper investment in election security. Congress has the obligation to protect the country from threats to national security and has the opportunity to act on this nonpartisan issue – after all, everyone votes on the same equipment.

“By making federal funds available, states will be able to replace aging, insecure voting equipment and implement modern security best practices, which include using voter-marked paper ballots and robust post-election audits. Despite the progress shown today, Congress still needs to vote on bipartisan, comprehensive election security legislation to protect and ensure trustworthy elections backed by adequate funds for state and local governments to implement such measures.”

Verified Voting Blog: Report on Rhode Island Risk Limiting Audit Pilot Implementation Study Released

Download the Full Report (PDF)

In October 2017, Rhode Island Governor Gina Raimondo signed into law a groundbreaking election security measure. Now, state law requires Rhode Island election officials to conduct risk-limiting audits, the “gold standard” of post-election audits, beginning with the 2020 primary. A risk-limiting audit (“RLA”) is an innovative, efficient tool to test the accuracy of election outcomes. Instead of auditing a predetermined number of ballots, officials conducting an RLA audit enough ballots to find strong statistical evidence that outcomes are correct. The law, enacted in the aftermath of two critical events relating to the 2016 elections, stems from decades of advocacy aimed at increasing the efficiency, transparency, and verifiability of political contests in the state. Rhode Island is now the second state, joining trailblazing Colorado, to mandate use of this modern tool statewide.

Following the law’s enactment, a group of professionals with expertise in election security and election administration formed the Rhode Island Risk-Limiting Audit (“RIRLA”) Working Group. As its name suggests, the RIRLA Working Group was established to assess the conditions in Rhode Island to help the state as it prepares to implement the law. The RIRLA Working Group recommended – and Rhode Island officials agreed – that the state should conduct pilot RLAs in advance of the 2020 deadline. The Rhode Island Board of Elections chose January 2019 as the date for the pilots and, based on several factors, selected Bristol, Cranston, and Portsmouth, Rhode Island as participating municipalities.

Leading up to the pilots, the RIRLA Working Group had regular conference calls, meetings, and other correspondence to gain greater familiarity with Rhode Island’s election laws, practices, and voting equipment. In partnership with the state, the RIRLA Working Group set a goal to plan and develop a trio of pilot audits that would both meet the state’s needs and adhere to the Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Tabulation Audits. Ultimately, the RIRLA Working Group drafted three separate audit protocols, step-by-step instructions to guide those who would conduct the RLAs over the course of two days.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Praises the DNC for Action on Virtual Caucuses

Verified Voting commends the Democratic National Committee on its recommendation that the Iowa and Nevada state parties cease their plans to allow voters to participate in next year’s presidential primary caucuses by phone.  Citing cybersecurity threats, the DNC concluded “that currently, there is no tele-caucus system available that is sufficiently secure and reliable, given the magnitude and timing of the Iowa and Nevada caucuses this cycle.”

Sources indicate that the DNC, still wary from their data being compromised in the lead up to the 2016 election, took an essential step in protecting their methods for running their elections – they brought in an outside team of election security experts to evaluate the system. Verified Voting recognizes that laudable goals can make new technology attractive.

Voters with disabilities should have the opportunity to take part in caucuses. In geographically large districts, not everyone can afford the travel time to gather in a central location. However, as our experts have frequently noted, internet and phone voting offer no means of verifying that tabulations match voter intent.

Media Release: Verified Voting Praises Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolf for Announcing Bond Financing to Reimburse Counties for Purchasing Voting Machines

Marian K. Schneider: “This move will ensure the smooth transition to secure and verifiable voting systems and will free up money for counties to use toward cybersecurity training and voter education.”

“Verified Voting is pleased with Gov. Wolf’s commitment to replace electronic voting systems. The availability of this $90 million financing will allow counties to fund the necessary replacement of unverifiable systems with verifiable ones. We are gratified that the Governor, as well as the Pennsylvania General Assembly, recognized the need to reimburse counties.

“This move will ensure the smooth transition to secure and verifiable voting systems and could free up money for counties to use toward cybersecurity training and voter education. Election security is a nonpartisan issue and the goal of hardening our voting systems against potential threats is shared across the aisle. Counties’ access to these funds is what is needed to ensure a smooth transition to paper-based electronic systems and routine, robust audits.

Verified Voting Blog: Statement to House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Joint Investigations & Oversight and Research & Technology Subcommittee

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Chairwoman Sherrill, Ranking Member Norman, Chairwoman Stevens, Ranking Member Baird and committee members, thank you for the invitation to submit a written statement in connection with the Joint Investigations & Oversight and Research & Technology Subcommittee Hearing on “Election Security: Voting Technology Vulnerabilities.” Our statement will focus on 1) a brief overview of technologies in use for election administration; 2) describe some of the risks associated with those technologies as well as solutions for mitigating those risks; 3) review the role that NIST and other agencies have played in developing technologies for secure elections; and 4) suggest regulatory changes necessary to address advances in voting technology and the changing threat model facing our elections.

The scale and scope of threats to U.S. elections go far beyond what the current federal policy framework can address. Since the Help America Vote Act was passed, technology has advanced and the security threat landscape has also evolved. It’s time to re-think the regulatory framework to align it with the current environment. Your committee plays a crucial role in shaping our collective response. We urge the committee to take the steps necessary to enact mandatory security measures for all technology that touches election administration, to ensure that the foundation of our democracy is protected from ongoing threats.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Public Comments on VVSG 2.0 Principles and Guidelines

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Verified Voting is pleased to see the VVSG 2.0 principles and guidelines finally moving forward. We are enthusiastic about the VVSG 2.0 structure and, with some reservations, about the content of the principles and guidelines. Full implementation of the VVSG 2.0 will, in time, help bring about voting systems that set new standards for universal usability, security, and verifiability. All these properties – backed by sound procedures – are essential to enable officials to run resilient elections, and to reassure voters that their votes have been cast as intended and counted as cast.

We urge the EAC to allow the technical requirements and test assertions to be approved and revised without a vote of the commissioners. We agree with the TGDC, the NASED executive council, and others that for several reasons, these documents are best managed by technical staff, adhering to a well-defined process with broad consultation and opportunity for public comment.

Verification and the VVSG

Verified Voting especially welcomes Principle 9, which stipulates that a voting system “is auditable and enables evidence-based elections,” and the associated guidelines. No matter how otherwise usable and reliable a voting system may be, it is unacceptably dangerous if it cannot provide trustworthy, software-independent evidence that people’s votes have been accurately recorded and counted.

A voting system alone can “enable” evidence-based elections but cannot provide them. As Philip Stark and David Wagner wrote in their seminal paper, the basic equation is that “evidence = auditability + auditing.” A voting system with a voter-verifiable audit trail, such as a voter-marked paper ballot, provides auditability. Compliance audits to ensure that the audit trail is substantially complete and accurate, and risk-limiting tabulation audits of the audit trail, provide actual evidence that outcomes are correct.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Testimony before the Allegheny County Pennsylvania Board of Elections

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Thank you, Chairman Baker and members of the Board, for allowing Verified Voting to submit written testimony in connection with the Public Meeting on the Purchase of Voting Systems. We hope to provide background on the security needs that counsel for the adoption of a new voting system with a verifiable and auditable paper ballot, and provide some high-level recommendations for consideration by the Board as it deliberates the purchase of new voting equipment for Allegheny County.

The Scope of the Problems with Election Security and Current Election Infrastructure

Election administration depends on computers at multiple points in the election process. Equipment for voting is but one part of a broad array of election technology infrastructure that supports the conduct of elections today. Some of that technology infrastructure includes voter registration databases, internet facing applications such as online voter registration and polling place lookup, network connections between state government and local jurisdictions, the computers that program the voting devices that record and count votes in addition to the voting devices themselves. Some jurisdictions also use electronic poll books to check voters in at polling sites and most states and localities report election night returns via a website.

To the extent that any of these can be compromised or manipulated, can contain errors, or can fail to operate correctly—or at all—this can potentially affect the vote. Election system security requires not only efforts to prevent breaches and malfunctions, but also fail-safes that address breaches or malfunctions that do occur and procedures to confirm the correctness of election outcomes.

Media Release: Verified Voting Applauds Oregon’s Senate for Passing Bill Requiring Robust Post-Election Audits to Verify Elections

Marian K. Schneider: “Oregon is leading the way towards better integrity and security with the passage of SB 944.”

The following is a statement from Marian K. Schneider, president of Verified Voting, on Oregon’s Senate passage of SB 944, offering counties the option to audit elections using a process known as risk-limiting audits, which are designed to bolster public confidence in elections. For additional media inquiries, please contact aurora@newheightscommunications.com  

“Oregon is leading the way towards better election integrity and security with the Senate’s passage of SB 944. This bill requires county clerks across the state to conduct audits after every election — not just general elections — and lets them choose between a partial hand count and risk-limiting audits (RLAs). An RLA examines a sample of the paper ballots to check if the election outcome is correct.  RLAs provide strong evidence when election outcomes are correct, and have a guaranteed large chance of correcting wrong outcomes or, outcomes that are wrong because of counting errors.

Verified Voting Blog: Election Cybersecurity Legislation Hits a Wall, RobinHood Visits Baltimore, and of course Florida

“According to a joint report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and IT industry professional association ACS, one in five national elections held worldwide since 2016 were potentially influenced by foreign interference, … “Democracies around the world have been struggling to grapple with foreign interference from state actors during elections,” International Cyber Policy Centre head Fergus Hanson said. “More empirical data means they can respond in a more targeted way calibrating policy responses to the likely risk, methods and adversary.” Technology Decisions

In an extensive Roll Call article this morning, Gopal Ratnam reports that despite the best intentions of election officials and many lawmakers, in 2020 many jurisdictions will be using “voting machines that are woefully outdated and that any tampering by adversaries could lead to disputed results.”

In addition to eliminating direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines and requiring routine post-election audits, many of the legislative efforts have addresses cybersecurity vulnerabilities in voting systems. Edgardo Cortés, election security advisor at the Brennan Center for Justice noted, “In some sense, anything that has an internet connection can be hacked. Wireless capability, even if the functionality can be turned off through hardware or software, poses risks of remote access by adversaries, he said.”

Verified Voting President Marian Schneider explained inthe article that beyond prohibiting voting equipment that can connect to the internet, “machines may still need to have some type of wireless communication system so that administrators can upload new ballot information ahead of each election. Some counties and precincts insert manual cartridges into machines to upload ballot information, but others push out that information wirelessly because it’s easier.”

“The software on new models of voting machines would also need routine updates, and that would require some type of connectivity,” Schneider continued, “the question is, how you do it safely? Because we can’t reduce the risk to zero, we need to do audits to check the results after. Post-election audits, in which samples of cast paper ballots are recounted, is considered the gold standard for verifying election results, but few states conduct them.”

Verified Voting Blog: Counting Votes: Paper Ballots and Audits in Congress, Crisis at the EAC?, Florida’s Mystery Counties

In her testimony at an election security hearing before the Committee on House Administration last week, Verified Voting President Marian Schneider joined advocates and election officials in calling on Congress to help states and local jurisdictions replace aging voting systems, conduct risk-limiting audits and enhance election infrastructure security. In order to prepare for 2020, Congress must provide “adequate financial investment in cyber security best practices, replacement equipment and post-election audit processes … immediately and continue at a sustainable level moving forward.”

Writing in Governing, Graham Vyse highlighted the significant bipartisan agreement between the two secretaries of state who testified, Jocelyn Benson (D-MI) and John Merrill (R-AL), on efforts needed to address emerging threats to election security. Significantly, the state election officials, along with all the witnesses, were unanimous in recommending the replacement of direct recording electronic voting machines with paper ballot voting systems and conducting post-election ballot audits.

Two days after the hearing, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie Thompson (D-MS), House Administration Committee Chairwoman Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) and Rep. John Sarbanes (D-MD), the chairman of the Democracy Reform Task Forcereintroduced The Election Security Act. Aimed at reducing risks posed by cyberattacks by foreign entities or other actors against U.S. election systems, the bill would establish cybersecurity standards for voting system vendors and require states to use paper ballots during elections.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Letter in Support of Congressional Election Cybersecurity Legislation

This letter was sent to Senators Cory Gardner (R-CO), Mark Warner (D-VA) and Representatives Derek Kilmer (D-WA) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) on May 14, 2019. Download the PDF. Thank you for introducing legislation aimed at increasing cybersecurity at the state and local levels of government. We recognize the need for this important legislation, which is aimed at hardening cyber resiliency efforts and preventing vulnerabilities from becoming nightmare realities. For the states that would respond to the proposed grants in H.R. 2130 and S.1065, and for the protection of the citizens who live in them, we applaud your support in the battle against cyberattacks. At the same time that you are bolstering cybersecurity defenses, we encourage you to add provisions specifically prohibiting these funds from being used for internet-based voting. Cybersecurity experts agree that internet return of marked ballots lacks sufficient safeguards for security and privacy. We urge you to specifically name internet voting as a threat and prohibit the funding provided by your legislation from being used to support internet voting programs and pilots. Cybersecurity experts agree that no current technology, including blockchain voting, can guarantee the secure, verifiable, and private return of voted ballots over the internet. Both because vote-rigging malware could already be present on the voter's computer and because electronically returned ballots could be intercepted and changed or discarded en route, local elections officials would be unable to verify that the voter’s ballot accurately reflects the voter’s intent. Furthermore, even if the voter's selections were to arrive intact, the voted ballot could be traceable back to the individual voter, violating voter privacy.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Testimony Before the House Administration Committee hearing on “Election Security"

Download the Written Testimony (pdf)
Chair Lofgren, Ranking Member Davis and members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to submit testimony to the Committee on House Administration hearing on “Election Security.” We urge the Committee to move expeditiously to support state and local jurisdictions in strengthening their election systems and provide upfront and sustained investment in election infrastructure and security. Since 2016, it is clear that the threat to our democratic institution of voting is not theoretical, but real and persistent. We must, as a nation, adopt the clear solutions that will allow us to defuse the destructive narrative of election hacking that undermines the very fabric of our democracy.
The Scope of the Problems with Election Security and Current Election Infrastructure
Election administration depends on computers at multiple points in the election process. Equipment for voting is but one part of a broad array of election technology infrastructure that supports the conduct of elections today. Some of that technology infrastructure includes voter registration databases, internet facing applications such as online voter registration and polling place lookup, network connections between state government and local jurisdictions, the computers that program the voting devices that record and count votes in addition to the voting devices themselves. Some jurisdictions also use electronic poll books to check voters in at polling sites and most states and localities report election night returns via a website.
To the extent that any of these can be compromised or manipulated, can contain errors, or can fail to operate correctly—or at all—this can potentially affect the vote. Election system security requires not only efforts to prevent breaches and malfunctions, but also fail-safes that address breaches and malfunctions that do occur.

Verified Voting Blog: Counting Votes May 16 2019

In her testimony at an election security hearing before the Committee on House Administration last week, Verified Voting President Marian Schneider joined advocates and election officials in calling on Congress to help states and local jurisdictions replace aging voting systems, conduct risk-limiting audits and enhance election infrastructure security. In order to prepare for 2020, Congress must provide “adequate financial investment in cyber security best practices, replacement equipment and post-election audit processes … immediately and continue at a sustainable level moving forward.”

Writing in Governing, Graham Vyse highlighted the significant bipartisan agreement between the two secretaries of state who testified, Jocelyn Benson (D-MI)and John Merrill (R-AL) on efforts needed to address emerging threats to election security. Along with all the witnesses, the state election officials agreed that more federal funding for election security was needed. Significantly the witnesses were also unanimous in recommending the replacement of direct recording electronic voting machines with paper ballot voting system and conducting post-election ballot audits.

Two days after the hearing, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie Thompson (D-MS), House Administration Committee Chairwoman Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) and Rep. John Sarbanes (D-MD), the chairman of the Democracy Reform Task Force reintroduced The Election Security Act. Aimed at reducing risks posed by cyberattacks by foreign entities or other actors against U.S. election systems, the bill would establish cybersecurity standards for voting system vendors and require states to use paper ballots during elections.

The resignation of the Election Assistance Commission’s head of voting system testing and certification reflects an agency crisis according to Politico’s Morning Cybersecurity. Macias’ departure may be related to an exchange  at an EAC field hearing, when Commissioner Christy McCormick repeatedly asked Macias why EAC commissioners didn’t have final approval over the details of federal voting system standards. After Macias leaves on May 17, the EAC will have only one employee working full-time on assessing voting machines based on federal standards former Colorado voting security expert Jerome Lovato, who, according to an email obtained by CyberScoop, the EAC has appointed Lovato to replace Macias. The EAC’s internal announcement cited Lovato’s experience testing and piloting voting systems and his familiarity with risk-limiting audits. He previously worked for a decade as a voting systems specialist at the Colorado Secretary of State’s office.

Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) has contacted VR Systems, the Florida voter-registration software maker that the FBI apparently believes Russia hacked, asking if “the company ever engaged a third party to conduct a forensic examination of its computer networks and systems since the hacking assertions first came to light after the 2016 election”. As Kim Zetter reports in Politico, VR Systems, insists it wasn’t hacked, referencing an analysis by FireEye to claim there was never an intrusion in VR System’s EVID servers or network. A separate FBI investigation indicated that malware was installed on the network of a vendor fitting VR Systems’ description.

After a briefing last Friday with the FBI and DHS, Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, revealed that, according to the Müller investigation, election information in two Florida counties was accessed by Russian hackers in 2016.

Verified Voting Blog: Statement on Maryland HB706/SB919 Online Delivery and Marking of Absentee Ballots

To download the PDF click here.

Verified Voting supports Maryland House Bill 706 (Senate Bill 919) as an immediate, short-term mitigation to reduce risks inherent in Maryland’s current online absentee ballot system by limiting its use to only those who would otherwise be unable to vote. Going forward, substantial changes are necessary to provide Maryland’s voters with secure, reliable, accessible means of voting absentee.

Verified Voting supports the objective of helping voters to obtain their ballots and cast their votes, but any technology used for this purpose must be carefully evaluated. Regrettably, computer scientists and others have found that Maryland’s system has several grave shortcomings.

Because Maryland does not check signatures on returned absentee ballots, there is no way to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate ballots. Using information that is widely available, an attacker could readily request, electronically receive (at multiple fake email addresses), and cast any number of absentee ballots.[1.This information includes personal identifiers that in principle are private, but in practice can be inexpensively purchased in bulk.] Even if the attacker did not cast the ballots, any voters purported to have requested absentee ballots would be required to cast provisional ballots, creating chaos and suspicion and increasing the likelihood that the voter will be disenfranchised.

Media Release: Verified Voting Applauds Rep. Daryl Metcalfe, Rep. Garth Everett and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer’s Nonpartisan Call for the Penn. General Assembly to Appropriate Funding to Replace Vulnerable Electronic Voting Machines

Marian K. Schneider: “Election security is a nonpartisan issue and the goal of hardening our voting systems against potential threats is shared across the aisle.”

The following is a statement from Marian K. Schneider, president of Verified Voting, formerly Deputy Secretary for Elections and Administration in the Pennsylvania Department of State, following the press conference with Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer this morning in Harrisburg, PA. Lt. Col. Shaffer also testified during the Senate Committee on State Government Hearing on Senate Bill 48 this morning.

“Verified Voting applauds Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer’s testimony this morning urging Pennsylvania to replace all paperless DREs and for underscoring that this is a cybersecurity threat that needs to be addressed. The Pennsylvania legislature needs to appropriate additional funding to reimburse counties for the cost of replacing aging and vulnerable electronic voting machines with ones that have a voter-marked paper ballot of votes cast before the 2020 election.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Statement on EAC Chair Christy McCormick

The following is a statement from Verified Voting's president, Marian K. Schneider:

"Verified Voting congratulates Christy McCormick on her election as Chair of the Election Assistance Commission and her three priorities for her tenure: election preparedness, replacing aging voting equipment, and working towards improving accessibility for all voters including voters with disabilities, military and overseas voters and limited English proficient voters.

"With those laudable goals in mind, Verified Voting urges Christy McCormick and the EAC to ensure that the next generation of voting systems provide most voters the opportunity to mark their ballots by hand and support robust post-election tabulation audits. These post-election audits can protect the integrity of the election outcomes with the existing systems.Technology has evolved so that improved security, verifiability and accessibility are not mutually exclusive, but can give everyone, the candidates, voters, the press and the public assurance that our voting system is resilient against attack."

Pennsylvania: Controversy swirls around new Philadelphia city voting system | WHYY

Philadelphia’s three city commissioners, who run local elections, may announce the selection of a new voting system as soon as Wednesday, and it may leave some disappointed. “We’re worried the city commissioners are going to pick a voting system that is not only very expensive, but not a good system for security,” said Rich Garella of the group Citizens for Better Elections. “It has poor access for disabled people. It’s a bad choice.” The state is requiring all counties to get new voting machines this year that generate paper ballot backups. City commissioners are mum about what kind of voting system they might recommend at their Wednesday meeting, but Garella and State Auditor General Eugene DePasquale said the city’s selection process seems tilted toward a particular system and a single vendor. … That vendor is Omaha-based Election Systems & Software, known as ES&S, the largest manufacturer of voting systems in the country. The ES&S Express Vote XL system is the only one sold in the U.S. that shows voters all candidates for all races on one electronic screen.

National: Where cybersecurity legislation ‘goes to die’ in Congress | Politico

Wisconsin Republican Sen. Ron Johnson leads the committee with broad oversight over the nation’s most important cybersecurity issues, including protecting consumers and U.S. elections from hackers. But he’s also a major reason little legislation on these topics ever passes, according to lobbyists, cybersecurity policy experts, lawmakers and congressional aides from both parties who spoke with POLITICO. Johnson or members of his staff have derailed many of the most significant cybersecurity-related bills in the past four years, including legislation to secure elections, study whether the growing use of encrypted apps hampers law enforcement, and hold companies accountable for the proliferation of insecure connected devices, people who track the legislation told POLITICO.