In a wide-ranging set of indictments handed down on July 13, 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) charged 12 Russian intelligence officers with brazenly attacking U.S. election infrastructure during the 2016 presidential election. On that same day, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats sounded the alarm that Russia is continuing its cyberattacks on the United States, ominously stating that “the warning lights are blinking red again,” just as they were before the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Coats went on to say that the nation’s election systems and other digital infrastructure are “literally under attack.” Yet, in the face of overwhelming evidence, for more than a year-and-a-half, President Donald Trump has cast doubt on these consistent warnings. It now is incumbent on Congress, key members of the administration, state and local officials, and other stakeholders to take aggressive steps within their respective purviews to secure our election infrastructure.Full Article: Time Running Out to Secure Against 2018 Election Cyberattacks.
The Senate could be headed for a showdown this week over funding for state election security. Democrats are pushing for a floor vote on an amendment that would set aside an additional $250 million in grants for states to upgrade their voting systems and make other improvements. But they face firm opposition from Republicans, who say the initial round of funding Congress provided states earlier this year is sufficient. A similar amendment was rejected by the House two weeks ago in a party-line vote. Election security funding is fast emerging as a political hill Democrats are willing to die on. Although the amendment is unlikely to pass in the GOP-controlled Senate, Democrats can use it to hammer President Trump at a time when the White House is frantically trying to patch up the damage from his recent flip-flopping on the threat from Russia. Democrats are also hoping that a floor fight over the merits of grant money could make Republicans look like they’re standing in the way of resources state officials say they need to protect the vote. Whether that will help Democrats come November is unclear, but public polling has showed strong majorities of Americans want to see more action from the administration on election security.Full Article: The Cybersecurity 202: The fight over election security comes to the Senate floor - The Washington Post.
A citizenship question on the 2020 census has already drawn challenges from states that fear an undercount of immigrants and a loss of federal funds. But demographers say there could be even deeper consequences: The question could generate the data necessary to redefine how political power is apportioned in America. Republicans officials, red states and conservatives behind a series of recent court cases have argued that districts historically allotted based on total population unfairly favor states and big cities with more undocumented immigrants, tilting power from states like Louisiana and Montana to California and New York. Congressional seats and state legislative districts should equally represent citizens or eligible voters, they say, not everyone.Full Article: A Census Question That Could Change How Power Is Divided in America - The New York Times.
National: How the Russian government used disinformation and cyber warfare in 2016 election – an ethical hacker explains | phys.org
The Soviet Union and now Russia under Vladimir Putin have waged a political power struggle against the West for nearly a century. Spreading false and distorted information – called “dezinformatsiya” after the Russian word for “disinformation” – is an age-old strategy for coordinated and sustained influence campaigns that have interrupted the possibility of level-headed political discourse. Emerging reports that Russian hackers targeted a Democratic senator’s 2018 reelection campaign suggest that what happened in the lead-up to the 2016 presidential election may be set to recur. As an ethical hacker, security researcher and data analyst, I have seen firsthand how disinformation is becoming the new focus of cyberattacks. In a recent talk, I suggested that cyberwarfare is no longer just about the technical details of computer ports and protocols. Rather, disinformation and social media are rapidly becoming the best hacking tools. With social media, anyone – even Russian intelligence officers and professional trolls – can widely publish misleading content. As legendary hacker Kevin Mitnick put it, “it’s easier to manipulate people rather than technology.”Full Article: How the Russian government used disinformation and cyber warfare in 2016 election – an ethical hacker explains.
Last year, Defcon’s Voting Village made headlines for uncovering massive security issues in America’s electronic voting machines. Unsurprisingly, voting-machine makers are working to prevent a repeat performance at this year’s show. According to Voting Village organizers, they’re having a tough time getting their hands on machines for white-hat hackers to test at the next Defcon event in Las Vegas (held in August). That’s because voting-machine makers are scrambling to get the machines off eBay and keep them out of the hands of the “good guy” hackers. Village co-organizer Harri Hursti told attendees at the Shmoocon hacking conference this month they were having a hard time preparing for this year’s show, in part because voting machine manufacturers sent threatening letters to eBay resellers. The intimidating missives told auctioneers that selling the machines is illegal — which is false.Full Article: Voting-machine makers are already worried about Defcon.
Honorable Members of the Commission: I serve as Senior Advisor to Verified Voting, a national non-partisan non-profit educational and advocacy organization committed to safeguarding elections in the digital age. Verified Voting advocates for the responsible use of emerging technologies to ensure that Americans can be confident their votes will be cast as intended and counted as cast. We promote auditable, accessible and resilient voting for all eligible citizens. I previously served as President of Verified Voting for more than a decade. I have provided information and testimony on voting technology and policy issues at federal and state levels, including to the US House of Representatives Committee on House Administration, and earlier this year at the Joint Hearing of Assembly Elections and Redistricting and Senate Elections and Constitutional Amendments Committees, on Cybersecurity and California’s Elections.1
I have curated an extensive information resource on election equipment and regulations nationwide, and co-authored several key works on election security policy, including Principles & Best Practices for Post Election Audits2 and the introductory chapter of Confirming Elections: Creating Confidence and Integrity through Election Auditing.3 I participate in the Future of California Elections, a collaboration between election officials, civil rights organizations and election reform advocates to examine and address the unique challenges facing the State of California’s election system.[4. Futureofcaelections.org] I also serve on the Los Angeles County Voting Systems for All People (VSAP) Technical Advisory Committee.4
In my capacity at Verified Voting I have worked with advocates, election officials and lawmakers from all across the country. In my view, the states that do the best on metrics relating to voting system security are often the ones that continue to look for and embrace opportunities to improve. As security threats do not stand still, neither can those whose work it is to safeguard our elections and consequently our democracy. I applaud the Little Hoover Commission for taking up this crucial topic of investigation, and am pleased to participate in and contribute to that effort.
Election security is not an on-off switch, where a thing either is secure or it is not. Rather it involves incrementing layers of effort, analysis, systems and procedures, all created or conducted by people, all while balancing costs and priorities. Such incremental measures harden a system, making it more secure than before and solving for problems when they occur. Perfect security is not attainable, but diligence in the pursuit of secure elections is.
As hard as we try, there will always be another vulnerability discovered; this should not discourage our effort. We should take those steps, and not make it easy for tampering to occur, even while recognizing that there’s no such thing as a completely tamperproof system. Instead, our focus should be on reducing and mitigating for vulnerabilities, and on recoverability, such that no matter what happens, we can say to the public “We take these steps to ensure all will be able to have confidence in the accuracy of the outcome and that everyone who wanted to participate was able to do so.”
Voters need to know elections are working the way they should, or they won’t have the confidence to participate. Ensuring voters know we are taking all possible steps to secure the vote is a way to remove the obstacle of “lack of confidence” and we do this to protect and support all the other things we do to make it possible for every eligible person to vote.
This work cannot be the responsibility of elections officials alone; lawmakers must also support this effort by finding ways to ensure those hard-working officials have the resources they need to meet both the demands of running elections generally, and the special requirements of addressing today’s intense security threat environment and meeting the inevitable issues that arise with resilience.
1. Define security as it relates to voting equipment.
Good elections require technology to be available and functioning correctly and reliably; secure elections require us to be able to prove that this was the case. It can be useful to look at security issues through the filter of how they will affect the ability of voters to cast an effective ballot. In this context, “effective” means that:
• the voter is not derailed in their quest to vote by a failed electronic poll book, or tampered registration list;
• the ballot is available to the voter (including any system to be used for marking the ballot);
• the voter receives the correct ballot, that it is presented complete;
• it is feasible to mark, check/verify and cast the ballot safely, and privately;
• the ballot is counted correctly, along with all the other ballots; and
• we can demonstrate that fact to the satisfaction of the public, including those on the side of the losing candidate or issue.
For election system security, prevention and detection of tampering is obviously important. For secure election outcomes and ensuring that all voters who show up can cast an effective ballot, even more critical is the ability to recover, both real time and after the fact. This means that even in the face of a voter registration breach that we were unable to prevent, even if there were undetected tampering in your voting system software, even if some systems failed or were caused to fail on Election Day, people can vote and votes are counted correctly.
Equipment for voting is but one part of a broad array of election technology infrastructure that supports the conduct of elections today. Technology touches the voter and the vote at various stages of the electoral process, from getting information to registering to checking in to vote, to marking, casting, counting and reporting votes. Election systems therefore include not only the systems we use for marking our ballots and for tallying the votes, but also the systems we use for registering to vote or updating our registration, the systems that election officials use to set up the many ballot styles with the correct candidate names and ballot measures and languages and so on. Other systems include electronic poll-books and ballot on demand systems, which must be able to find the right information for the voter and produce the right ballot, and even networks on which election officials provide information to voters and/or election night reporting.
To the extent that any of these can be compromised or manipulated, can contain errors, or can fail to operate correctly—or at all—this can potentially affect the vote. So election system security requires not only working to prevent breaches and malfunctions, but also fail-safes that address breaches and malfunctions that do occur. Cyber security experts agree that security breaches are not a matter of “if” but “when.” Assuming such problems will occur, fail-safes must be in place.
For technology used for marking and counting votes, voters must be able to confirm firsthand their ballots were indeed marked as they intended, and election officials must be able to use those ballots to demonstrate that all the votes were included and were counted as cast.
This bridge between the voter and correctly reported outcomes requires a physical artifact as evidence of the voter’s intent, and a process for checking. That artifact is typically the paper ballot the voter marked, either manually or through the use of an accessible interface such as a ballot marking device; alternatively it may be the voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) produced by a direct recording electronic voting machine. It can also be the printout that gets mailed in when a voter uses a remote accessible ballot marking method from home. Whatever the physical record, it must have been available to the voter for his or her review prior to casting in order to serve as a record of voter intent.
Not all voters will take the opportunity to review their ballot, and there is no requirement to do so, but the ballot they had the opportunity to review is the only record that can be construed to represent their intent. Although voting systems have other ways to produce physical records like print-outs of what are called ballot images or printouts of cast vote records from voting or vote counting machines after the fact, if the voter did not have the opportunity to review that printed record, it cannot serve as a record of voter intent.
While a voter can review choices on an electronic screen, unlike the physical artifact the electronic version is not independent of software that enables marking, casting or counting of ballots, and of the software that may –possibly incorrectly—render an image of the physical ballot. This property of software independence5 is crucial for checking the correct functioning of the software. Given that either an attack on the electronic system’s software or a malfunction in that same system can produce an incorrect rendering of an individual ballot’s contents or of the overall results, the ability to make a separate and independent check that the voters’ intent was captured correctly is crucial for security.
The process for checking the functioning of the software is the post-election audit. In a good audit, a sufficient portion of voter-verified paper ballots will be checked to ensure the voting system correctly captured their intent. This process does not stand alone. Other compliance procedures ensure that all ballots are accounted for and the numbers of ballots cast reconciles with the number of voters who signed in, and that important chain of custody security procedures have been followed each election. Put together, these practices create a trustworthy record that enables us to confirm or correct our election outcomes.
One common concern is whether voting systems are connected to the Internet, a common avenue for hacking intrusion or transmittal of malware. California’s voting system requirements prohibit connection to the Internet. This safety measure reduces the “attack surface” available to those who would tamper, to mitigate for remote attacks on live voting and for other purposes. However, experts note that even systems not directly connected to the Internet are “vulnerable to viruses and malware spread through portable memory devices. Furthermore, sophisticated software attacks can be designed to be inactive and undetectable during pre-election testing”6 of voting systems, a process every county undertakes for each election.
Pre-election testing is important for several purposes, including confirming that the ballot styles are complete and correct, and voting systems are functioning as they are being prepared for deployment to polling places, and so on. To that extent, it is necessary for supporting secure practices in elections, though not sufficient on its own to confirm outcomes.
Similarly, the battery of tests conducted during the process of voting system certification provides useful information about the correct functioning of a voting system and its components—at the time it is tested. Once a system is in the field, however, it cannot be assumed to be in the same state that it was upon certification. Software and election configurations have been uploaded and potentially modifications have occurred. Further, it should be noted that each voting system that was found to have vulnerabilities in the past was tested and certified in some measure. The only way to ensure it performed correctly in the field in a real election is to check the outcome after the fact, using sufficient records of voter intent in a robust audit.
For voter registration systems and the networked systems that support the voter lists during the election, a fail-safe would be a system that enables election officials and voters to be able to check their electronic registration record to ensure their name is included and a means to resolve the record if it was not, so that a voter is not prevented from participating even if something went wrong with the registration system just prior to the election, or the electronic poll roster of voters, or the like. Election officials must have a working copy of the voter list that is completely separate from a protected, off-line “original” master list, so the master is never at risk.
2. Please provide an overview of how the nature of perceived security threats against voting systems has changed over the past decade. Is CA prepared for its Secretary of State’s office and county election officials to be the front line against attacks from foreign actors?
Savvy election officials everywhere – from county level to state level – have always taken election security seriously, but after breaches of voter-registration sites were initially reported in mid-2016 the subject has risen to a top-level priority nationally. At many conferences for state and local election officials, security now is a topic of keynotes and workshops, efforts led by some of California’s own election officials.
At the federal level, the number of Congressional hearings related to election security is in the double digits since mid-2016, more than in the past ten years combined. The Department of Homeland Security declared election infrastructure as part of “critical infrastructure” and now provides tools and services to county and state level elections offices on request. Earlier this year the sum of $380 million was allocated in federal appropriations for states to spend on improving election security, including for replacement of paperless voting systems with systems like California’s that provide a voter-verified paper record, upgrading election-related computer systems to address vulnerabilities, provide cyber security training and best practices implementation, and for conducting post-election audits.7 California’s share of those funds requested by Secretary of State Padilla is nearly $34.6 million.
Is California prepared in its front line against nation-state adversaries? California is more prepared than some states, and has been taking security seriously for some time. In 2004 California took steps to ensure that all our elections require the use of a voter-verifiable paper ballot or VVPAT for most voting.8
Since 1965, when California first started using electronic methods for scanning and counting votes, we have had a requirement in place for a basic manual tally audit conducted by every county after every election.9 We subsequently tested more robust methods known as risk-limiting audits through a pilot program passed by the legislature in 2010,10 and a bill is currently under consideration in California’s legislature relating to the conduct of risk-limiting audits.11
The state has led the nation in its significant efforts to examine voting system security more closely, including but not limited to efforts such as the 2007 Top to Bottom Review of Voting Systems12; initiating the regular practice of volume testing of voting systems under conditions that simulate a high-volume election, of voting systems submitted for certification; and the passage of a more stringent set of requirements for voting system testing and certification13 at a time when the Federal body for setting testing standards was (temporarily) moribund. California also certifies ballot-on-demand printers and remote accessible vote by mail systems. These are important steps to ensure such systems meet basic functional requirements.
Work remains to be done to support the preparedness of the state and its county election offices in their shifting role on the cyber security front lines, however. The state does not yet require audits robust enough to strictly limit the risk of confirming an incorrect outcome. Manual recounts of specific contests are available upon request, but even if it falls to a candidate or her supporters to ensure a particular outcome was correct, doing so may prove cost prohibitive, and omits confirmation of other contests on the ballot.
California is one of a few states requiring certification of electronic poll book (EPB) systems. The state recently promulgated a set of regulations for testing EPB systems; we felt these were insufficiently stringent and not altogether clear. We submitted comments highlighting areas for improvement, though few changes were made. These requirements should be strengthened, in light of EPBs’ potential to impact the ability of a voter to cast an effective ballot, so that counties seeking to buy such systems are supported in their efforts at diligence in securing elections.
Some counties have substantially greater resources than others, but all counties need security resources. Secretary of State Padilla’s calls for funding for more up to date equipment and for cyber security efforts were supported in recent appropriations.14 The Secretary has moved forward with the establishment of an Office of Elections Cybersecurity (OEC), which would coordinate information sharing between federal, state and county officials to address reducing the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could threaten the state’s elections. Ensuring that such an entity aids election officials and their staff in understanding cyber hygiene and best practices in cyber security will strengthen the state’s preparedness.
3. Please provide a high level introduction to general security threats to voting equipment that election officials face in the process of voter registration, at the polling place on Election Day and in counting and reporting election results.
Election officials are faced with efforts by attackers to breach their registration systems, websites and networks through a variety of means. These can include direct web-based attacks that seek to inject or send commands to enable the attacker to gain unauthorized access to information; denial of service (DoS) attacks that prevent legitimate users from being able to use election information or services; ransomware attacks that block legitimate users’ access to a system until a ransom is paid; and more. Phishing attacks involve forged emails or other messages designed to get the recipient to click on malicious links or otherwise provide an entry point for stealing credentials such as passwords, spread malware or disrupt voting operations. Foreign adversaries successfully used some of these methods in 2016.
Security practices prevent most, but not all, such attacks from being successful. These include keeping applications and operating systems patched with the latest updates; whitelisting, or making sure only specified programs are allowed to run while blocking all others; restricting administrative privileges to help limit the spread of malware; and ensuring appropriate firewalls are in place and properly configured. While these methods can block up to 85% of targeted attacks, the Department of Homeland Security recommends additional steps15 for protecting voter registration systems from harm and ensuring continuity of operations, including penetration testing, vulnerability scanning and patching, development of an incident response plan, and staff training on cyber security best practices.
Election officials also must securely store, maintain, prepare and test their voting systems in preparation for each election, ensuring that unauthorized access is prevented and security protocols are followed for uploading new ballot definitions and preparing systems for deployment. Once deployed to a polling place, poll workers oversee physical security of the voting system until the system is returned to the county office. Both poll workers and elections staff must manage the secure chain of custody of election materials, including voted ballots and signed rosters. Threats to voting systems can include insider tampering via injection of malware through a tampered memory device or other communication method, tampering or damage to a voting system en route to or at a polling location, which could result in “denial of service” if the voting system is not functioning, or altered results.
Election officials initiate counting of voted ballots on Election Day, with vote by mail ballots counted at the county’s election facility and, depending on the type of voting system used, polling place ballots counted in the local polling place once voting has finished. Threats to central count tally systems are similar to those for polling place voting systems, except that such centrally located systems are accessed by significantly fewer people. Election night reporting methods could involve risks if systems for communicating results were breached.
Although incorrect or tampered reports can be corrected, because of intense public interest and scrutiny such reports can lead to significant public concern.
3a. Does the new vote center model provided through the 2016 Voter Choice Act create opportunities for new security threats?
The 2016 Voter Choice Act, or VCA, requires participating counties to establish vote centers, similar to precinct-based polling places but serving voters from the entire county rather than just from within a local area. In order to meet the needs of voters from anywhere within the county’s borders, a vote center must be able to ascertain the voter’s status and provide the correct ballot for the voter, out of a large number of ballot styles (which vary based on the voter’s geographic area). Doing so means deployment of some potentially new equipment, including ballot-on-demand printing systems and electronic poll books or other means of access to the county’s voter registration data.
Further, voters can now be registered to vote on the same day they arrive at a vote center in participating counties, even if they missed the pre-election deadline. This process of “conditional voter registration” also requires a means of connecting with the county’s voter registration system. As San Mateo County described it in their VCA election administration plan16: “At each Vote Center, a network of computers will be linked to the County’s Election Management System (EMS) through a secure VPN connection.”
Any networked connection to a county’s voter registration election management system17 raises potential security concerns. VPNs can solve some issues, but vulnerabilities continue to be uncovered. Electronic voter registration management systems have been targeted18 as was apparently a service provider of electronic poll book systems19 that does business in several states including California.
One other new requirement that arose in part from the passage of the Voter Choice Act but which will apply to all counties is the use of remote accessible vote by mail systems to serve voters with disabilities who vote by mail.
4. Please explain for the Commission what attackers are trying to accomplish when targeting voting equipment. Are they always trying to alter the outcome of an election or do they sometimes have other goals?
It has been said that elections must not just show who won, but indeed must prove to the losers and their supporters that they lost legitimately. Today voters, election officials and elected officials alike are keenly aware that we face attacks on our democracy and the systems that support it. Voters need confidence in those systems, to encourage full participation. Doubts about the outcome of an election can be corrosive to voter confidence.
Disruption of elections can take many forms. Voting systems may be targeted. Systems that cannot be audited, or that are not robustly audited, are particularly vulnerable because tampering may not be apparent without a systematic review. Auditable systems and robust audits strongly mitigate the effects of such attacks, and correlate to a positive effect on voter confidence.20
An attacker may seek to disrupt an election to generate uncertainty about the results. Election night reporting systems may be targeted. Even if voting systems counted the votes correctly, an attacker could seek to alter posted results or interrupt the reporting of results, without affecting actual vote totals or counting equipment. Ensuring the public understands that preliminary results are just that—preliminary and not final—and that there are checks to ensure the accuracy of the final count are important tasks, but not necessarily easy to do.
Attackers also may seek to interrupt the voting process, even targeting specific communities in order to skew the outcome, without affecting voting or vote counting machines. This could happen when electronic poll books in certain parts of a jurisdiction—perhaps parts that skew more heavily to one party than to others—fail to boot up or are caused to slow down or stop working. Mitigations exist, but can take valuable time to deploy.
5. Given the increasingly sophisticated security threats to which voting and vote counting are subjected, please explain why we should use technology at all. Why not simply require all voting not requiring accessibility assistance to be conducted on paper with 100% manual counts?
Manual counts of voted ballots were used in the past, but decreased over the years to now a very tiny percentage of the nation’s overall ballot counting. For expedient initial election results, many would contend we cannot wait, so this practice is mostly confined to jurisdictions that are small and where the ballots are brief enough that they can indeed provide results in a timely enough fashion to satisfy their public.
Although some jurisdictions do conduct hand counts of paper ballots, the practicality and benefits of doing so would need to be weighed against the costs factoring in the length of the ballot, the number of ballots cast and the resources of the county.
We can take advantage of the benefits to transparency and security of a manual review of the voted ballots without having to count all of the ballots. Counting a portion of the ballots – using appropriate selection methods – can ensure that the speed of a near-immediate result on election night does not sacrifice the security provided by the careful direct review of a post-election audit, to confirm the voters’ intent.
6. Please share your assessment of what California is doing right with respect to voting security. What steps can state officials take to improve voting security?
As described above, California has long been a leader on improving security for election systems. The state has a relatively strong testing and certification program for voting systems that includes penetration testing and operational testing of voting systems under both normal and abnormal conditions, though as mentioned above there are some weaknesses in the requirements for electronic poll book systems. California requires all voting systems to use or produce a voter-verified paper ballot or record and conducts a manual tally of all contests on the ballot after every election. Though the manual tally is not robust enough to confirm electoral outcomes in most cases, the state has a track record of reaching toward more robust risk-limiting audits.
• We recommend that California commit to further development of risk limiting audits (beyond the currently pending bill which is time-delimited and opt-in only) and fund that development so that it is possible to conduct true statewide confirmation of election outcomes.
• We further recommend that California strengthen its requirements for electronic poll book testing.
California has seen some excellent examples of collaboration between officials and experts in auditing, accessibility and usability, and voting system security at both county and state levels. County-level examples of engaging experts to provide input on voting system requirements for security include the Los Angeles VSAP Technical Advisory Committee and the San Francisco Open Source Voting System Technical Advisory Committee.21 Past state efforts have included the Top to Bottom Review of Voting Systems, Voting System Accessibility Study, Post-Election Audit Study Working Group, and the Risk Limiting Audit Pilot Study funded by the Election Assistance Commission. We hope that the newly established Office of Elections Cybersecurity will continue that collaborative tradition.
• We recommend that the state continue to engage with technology experts; we have a wealth of scientists in the state that have already done substantial work relating to voting system security. California recently has found ways to smooth the path for development of new systems that are both non-proprietary and voter-centric, including through enabling legislation such as SB 360 that changed how we test and certify systems for adoption, and through provision of funding for nonproprietary systems.22 Open source systems still require the essential safeguards of a paper ballot and robust post-election audits, but as such systems are successfully developed and deployed, they can provide substantial cost-savings to counties, freeing resources for ongoing security improvements.
• We recommend that California continue to support the development of nonproprietary systems that meet or exceed current security guidelines.
• We further recommend that the state ensure it fulfills its funding commitments to the county elections offices.
Pursuant to statute, no part of a voting system can be connected to the Internet at any time, nor receive or transmit election data through an exterior communication network of any time. Aside from the carve-out for the electronic (fax) return of voted ballots, this remains a powerful safeguard that significantly reduces the threat surface to voting systems.
• Given the current threat environment, we recommend that California ensure this prohibition on Internet connections remains in place for the foreseeable future, and that the state reduce or eliminate the electronic transmission of voted ballots, while working to ensure that military and overseas voters are able to vote securely.
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the important work of the Little Hoover Commission and are available to respond to any questions on this topic at any time.
Editorials: Replace Georgia’s risky touchscreen voting machines | Richard DeMillo/Atlanta Journal Constitution
s the 2016 cyber-attacks on U.S. elections continue unabated this election year, most everyone agrees that Georgia’s aging, insecure voting machines must be replaced with a new system to increase public confidence. Georgia legislators tried this spring to authorize purchase of a new system, but the flawed legislation failed. That’s a good thing. It would have made the situation worse, not better. In the wake of this failure, Secretary of State Brian Kemp formed a blue-ribbon Commission on Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections (SAFE) to study the options for Georgia’s next voting system. In short, the Secretary set up a way for Georgia to dig itself out of its election integrity hole and leapfrog to the front of the pack nationwide. At SAFE’s first meeting, Mr. Kemp sabotaged his own commission. The laudable goal of that meeting was to describe Georgia’s current system. Briefing slides are available online. Not apparent in the published material is a disturbing pattern of giving SAFE false and misleading information. If not corrected, the Commission’s recommendations will be as flawed as other efforts to fix the current system. Here are five egregious examples of such misinformation.Full Article: Opinion: Replace Ga.’s risky touchscreen voting machines.
The Legislature on Monday sent to Gov. Charlie Baker a bill that would institute automatic voter registration in Massachusetts. Under the bill, an eligible voter who applies for a license or identification card at the Registry of Motor Vehicles or completes a transaction at MassHealth or the Health Connector would be automatically registered to vote. “We think it is one of the strongest automatic voter registration bills in the country,” said Pam Wilmot, executive director of Common Cause Massachusetts. “If signed by the governor, it will make voting more accurate, secure and participatory.”Full Article: Legislature sends automatic voter registration bill to Gov. Charlie Baker's desk | masslive.com.
Lawrence County government officials plan to buy new voting machines before the 2019 elections season. That will give the county some assurance that the system works before the next presidential election in 2020. But the price tag that comes with mandated machines with a paper trail is one that the taxpayers locally may have to eat, unless the state and federal governments come through with funding to back up their mandate. Ed Allison, county director of elections and voting, estimated that the cost for Lawrence County to meet the mandates with a new voting system could range between $750,000 to $1.5 million. Statewide, the cost is expected to be about $150 million for all 67 counties to comply, he said.Full Article: Taxpayers could foot bill for mandated voting machines | News | ncnewsonline.com.
Texas election officials have been removing more people from the state’s voter rolls ever since the Supreme Court struck down a part of the Voting Rights Act in 2013, according to a new report from the Brennan Center for Justice. The group says the court’s decision to specifically strike down one provision of the law led to the rise in voter purges. The preclearance provision, also known as Section 5, required several states – including Texas – to get an OK from the federal government before enacting voting laws, changing election procedures or taking people off voter rolls. States purge their voter rolls periodically to remove people who have died or committed a felony.Full Article: With Less Federal Supervision, Texas Drops More People From Voter Rolls | KUT.
Visiting Wisconsin on June 28, President Donald Trump tweeted “Russia continues to say they had nothing to do with meddling in our Election!” It was not the first time the president cast doubt on Russian interference in the 2016 election, contradicting conclusions of the FBI, CIA and National Security Agency, as well as reports by bipartisan committees in both chambers of Congress. But Russians have been testing the vulnerability of elections in Wisconsin and other states for years, and top U.S. intelligence officials have warned the 2018 midterm elections are a potential target of Russian cyber attacks and disinformation. A key swing state, Wisconsin was the scene of Russian measures in 2016 that utilized social media and also probed the websites of government agencies.Full Article: Wisconsin election voting systems still vulnerable to hacking.
Cambodians went to the polls last weekend, but it was a sham of an election, dominated by Hun Sen, the country’s aging autocrat. With the opposition party banned and soldiers at polling booths to ensure the outcome went only one way, no credible organization signed off on the election’s validity—but quite a few fake organizations did. Election observation in authoritarian regimes is a relatively new phenomenon. Beginning in the late 1980s, the number of elections monitored by intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and sovereign states increased substantially. This brought increased criticism of the behavior of authoritarian regimes, which signaled their compliance to the norm of external observation in exchange for certain benefits, such as legitimacy, foreign direct investment, and membership in international organizations. This gave democracy promotion actors, which coordinated a majority of election-monitoring missions, newfound leverage over the behavior of authoritarian regimes. In the last decade, however, dictators have fought back.Full Article: Fake Monitors Endorse Cambodia’s Sham Election – Foreign Policy.
Counting was under way on Monday in Mali following a key presidential election that saw balloting halted at hundreds of polling stations because of violence in restive regions of the poor Sahel country. Despite the violence, candidates and authorities praised Sunday’s first round of voting, relieved that the violence – which included the torching of polling stations and assaults on electoral officials – caused no casualties. Security was a central issue during the campaign, in which 73-year-old President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita is seeking re-election with the international community hoping the poll will strengthen a 2015 peace accord.Full Article: Counting under way after Mali's violence-marred poll | News24.
Britain on Friday said it shared concern expressed by international observer missions over reports of pressure on the media in Pakistan and the number of parties with links to proscribed groups who preach violence and intolerance during the Wednesday elections in the country. Noting that Jinnah’s vision of a tolerant, pluralist Pakistan remained central to a stable and cohesive Pakistani society, foreign secretary Jeremy Hunt said the election marked an “unprecedented second successive transfer of power from one full-term civilian government to another”.Full Article: Pakistan election: UK shares concern of observer missions | world news | Hindustan Times.
Last month, an election in Turkey kept President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his coalition in power. But experts are puzzled by the results — and caution that the election was not free and fair. Videos of ballot stuffing — mostly in eastern Turkey — in favor of pro-Erdogan parties went viral after they were posted online on election day. And both partisan and nonpartisan reports showed that allegations of electoral irregularity came primarily from eastern Turkey. An opposition-written report stated that 68 percent of the election day violations took place in the east — areas where Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) experienced significant gains. A report published by an independent fact-checking organization largely supports these claims.Full Article: Why the results of Turkey’s election are surprising - The Washington Post.
Counting has begun in Zimbabwe’s first election since the removal of Robert Mugabe, with the result determining the former British colony’s future for decades. Millions of people voted peacefully across the county on Monday and turnout appeared extremely high, with long lines of voters forming outside polling stations across the country when they opened at 7am (0600 BST). By early afternoon, polling officials in the capital, Harare, and surrounding towns were reporting that between 75% and 85% of registered voters had cast their ballots. Full results are not due until much later in the week, and possibly as late as the weekend. Speaking as he queued at a primary school on the outskirts of Harare – an opposition stronghold – Tinashe Musuwo, 20, said: “I am very optimistic this morning. Things will get better now.”Full Article: Zimbabwe election: counting begins in first post-Mugabe poll | World news | The Guardian.
National: Russians Are Targeting Private Election Companies, Too — And States Aren’t Doing Much About It | FiveThirtyEight
The American election system is a textbook example of federalism at work. States administer elections, and the federal government doesn’t have much say in how they do it. While this decentralized system has its benefits, it also means that there’s no across-the-board standard for election system cybersecurity practices. This lack of standardization has become all the more apparent over the past two years: Hackers probed 21 state systems during the lead-up to the 2016 election and gained access to one. But the federal government and states don’t appear to have made great strides to ensure that this doesn’t happen again. To do so, they’d need to deal with not only their own cybersecurity deficits but also those of the private companies that help states administer elections.Full Article: Russians Are Targeting Private Election Companies, Too — And States Aren’t Doing Much About It | FiveThirtyEight.
After nearly two years of calling Russian election interference a hoax and its investigation a witch hunt, President Donald Trump on Friday presided over the first National Security Council meeting devoted to defending American democracy from foreign manipulation. “The President has made it clear that his administration will not tolerate foreign interference in our elections from any nation state or other malicious actors,” the White House said in a statement afterward. But current and former officials tell NBC News that 19 months into his presidency, there is no coherent Trump administration strategy to combat foreign election interference — and no single person or agency in charge.Full Article: Trump admin has no central strategy for election security, and no one's in charge.
When Russian hackers targeted the staff of Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Mo., they took aim at maybe the most vulnerable sector of U.S. elections: campaigns. McCaskill’s Senate staff received fake emails, as first reported by The Daily Beast, in an apparent attempt by Russia’s GRU intelligence agency to gain access to passwords. McCaskill released a statement confirming the attack but said there is no indication the attack was successful. “Russia continues to engage in cyber warfare against our democracy. I will continue to speak out and press to hold them accountable,” McCaskill said. “I will not be intimidated. I’ve said it before and I will say it again, Putin is a thug and a bully.”Full Article: Russian Hackers Targeted The Most Vulnerable Part Of U.S. Elections. Again. : NPR.
Amid ongoing concern over continued efforts by Russian hackers to infiltrate U.S. election systems, Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire says that her office has been the subject of at least one phishing attack targeting email accounts and social media profiles. Shaheen’s experience comes after fellow Democratic Sen. Claire McCaskill of Missouri said that Russian hackers tried unsuccessfully to infiltrate her office’s computer network. Shaheen worries that the issue is more widespread than many think. “There has been one situation that we have turned over to authorities to look into, and we’re hearing that this is widespread, with political parties across the country, as well as with members of the Senate,” Shaheen told “Face the Nation” on Sunday.Full Article: Jeanne Shaheen: Senators targeted in "widespread" hacking attempts by Russia – Video from Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan today - CBS News.