Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Comment on Los Angeles County VSAP 2.0 Certification

The following is a comment on the certification process for Los Angeles County’s VSAP 2.0 system. To view a pdf, click here. Los Angeles County Voting Systems for All People (VSAP) 2.0 Certification Comment of Pamela Smith, Senior Advisor, Verified Voting January 20, 2020 Verified Voting commends Los Angeles County for the decade-long process of…

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Comments on proposed amendments to Georgia State Election Board rules

Download as PDF Verified Voting welcomes the opportunity to comment on the proposed amendments to Georgia’s State Election Board rules published on December 19, 2019. These amendments are wide-ranging, and we recognize that substantial work has gone into drafting them. Our comments focus on certain aspects especially relevant to cybersecurity and election verification. We substantially…

Verified Voting Blog: Letter to North Carolina Board of Elections Regarding Certification Waiver for ES&S EVS 5.2.4.0

Download the Letter (pdf) Dear Members of the North Carolina Board of Elections, I am writing to you in my capacity as President of Verified Voting. Please forgive the lateness of the communication as I only recently learned of your meeting today. I am writing to urge the State Board of Elections to proceed with…

Verified Voting Blog: Statement to House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Joint Investigations & Oversight and Research & Technology Subcommittee

Download as PDF Chairwoman Sherrill, Ranking Member Norman, Chairwoman Stevens, Ranking Member Baird and committee members, thank you for the invitation to submit a written statement in connection with the Joint Investigations & Oversight and Research & Technology Subcommittee Hearing on “Election Security: Voting Technology Vulnerabilities.” Our statement will focus on 1) a brief overview…

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Public Comments on VVSG 2.0 Principles and Guidelines

Download the PDF Verified Voting is pleased to see the VVSG 2.0 principles and guidelines finally moving forward. We are enthusiastic about the VVSG 2.0 structure and, with some reservations, about the content of the principles and guidelines. Full implementation of the VVSG 2.0 will, in time, help bring about voting systems that set new…

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Testimony before the Allegheny County Pennsylvania Board of Elections

Download the pdf Thank you, Chairman Baker and members of the Board, for allowing Verified Voting to submit written testimony in connection with the Public Meeting on the Purchase of Voting Systems. We hope to provide background on the security needs that counsel for the adoption of a new voting system with a verifiable and…

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Testimony Before the House Administration Committee hearing on “Election Security"

Download the Written Testimony (pdf) Chair Lofgren, Ranking Member Davis and members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to submit testimony to the Committee on House Administration hearing on “Election Security.” We urge the Committee to move expeditiously to support state and local jurisdictions in strengthening their election systems and provide upfront and…

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Testimony before the Pennsylvania Senate State Government Committee

Written Testimony of Verified Voting.org President Marian K. Schneider before the Pennsylvania Senate State Government Committee Public Hearing on Senate Bill 1249 and Voting Machine Demonstration, September 25, 2018. Download as PDF.

Thank you Chairman Folmer, Minority Chair Williams, and members of the Committee for allowing Verified Voting to submit written testimony in connection with the Senate State Government Committee hearing. We write to address the security risks presented for Pennsylvania’s counties and the need to expeditiously replace aging and vulnerable electronic voting systems. We urge the Committee to recommend that the Commonwealth appropriate adequate funding to permit counties to replace their aging electronic voting systems as soon as possible.

Verified Voting is a national non-partisan, non-profit research and advocacy organization committed to safeguarding elections in the digital age. Founded by computer scientists, Verified Voting’s mission is to advocate for the responsible use of emerging technologies to ensure that Americans can be confident their votes will be cast as intended and counted as cast. We promote auditable, accessible and resilient voting for all eligible citizens. Our board of directors and board of advisors include some of the top computer scientists, cyber security experts and statisticians working in the election administration arena as well as former and current elections officials. Verified Voting has no financial interest in the type of equipment used. Our goal is for every jurisdiction in the United States to have secure and verifiable elections.

There are two basic kinds of electronic voting systems in use in Pennsylvania: Direct recording electronic (DRE) or optical scan systems. Both types of systems are computers, and both are prepared in similar ways. The primary difference is that an optical scan system incorporates a voter-marked paper ballot, marked either with a pen or pencil or with a ballot marking device and that ballot is retained for recounts or audits. Optical scan systems leverage the speed of the computer to report unofficial results quickly. The presence and availability of that paper ballot provides a trustworthy record of voter intent and allows jurisdictions to monitor their system for problems, detect any problems, (either hacking or error), respond to them and recover by, if necessary, hand counting the paper ballots. Seventeen counties in Pennsylvania already benefit from the security protection of paper ballots.

Verified Voting Blog: Pamela Smith: Testimony Submitted to the Little Hoover Commission

Download Testimony as a PDF Honorable Members of the Commission: I serve as Senior Advisor to Verified Voting, a national non-partisan non-profit educational and advocacy organization committed to safeguarding elections in the digital age. Verified Voting advocates for the responsible use of emerging technologies to ensure that Americans can be confident their votes will be…

Verified Voting Public Commentary: Verified Voting Testimony before the Pennsylvania State Senate Senate State Government Committee: Voting System Technology and Security

Download as PDF The security of election infrastructure has taken on increased significance in the aftermath of the 2016 election cycle. During the 2016 election cycle, a nation-state conducted systematic, coordinated attacks on America’s election infrastructure, with the apparent aim of disrupting the election and undermining faith in America’s democratic institutions. Intelligence reports that have…

Verified Voting Blog: Testimony of Verified Voting to the Georgia House of Representatives House Science and Technology Committee

Download as PDF Georgia’s voting machines need an update. The lifespan of voting machines has been estimated at 10-15 years.1 Purchased in 2002 Georgia’s voting machines are at the outside of that estimate. As voting systems age they are more susceptible to error, malfunction or security threats potentially losing or miscounting votes. Georgia is one…

Verified Voting Blog: Testimony of Verified Voting to the New York State Assembly Standing Committee on Election Law

Download as PDF In 2016 the threat of cyber attacks on our elections from foreign entities became an alarming reality. We learned that an adversarial nation was targeting our election systems with the intent to disrupt and undermine the legitimacy of our free, democratic government. In the declassified report “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in…

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Testimony for the New Jersey State Assembly Judiciary Committee

Verified Voting is a national non-partisan, not for profit research and advocacy organization founded by computer scientists and committed to safeguarding democracy in the digital age. We promote technology and policies that ensure auditable, accessible and resilient voting for all eligible citizens. We urge you to adopt the proposed amendments and vote “YES” on A-4619.…

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Letter to the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

This letter was sent to the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence following a hearing on June 21, 2017. (Download PDF) Verified Voting vigorously applauds the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for its leadership and commitment to securing our elections. With clear evidence that foreign attackers sought to attack our 2016 elections through various means,…

Verified Voting Blog: Alex Halderman: Expert Testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

This testimony was delivered at a hearing on June 21, 2017. (Download PDF) Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to speak today about the security of U.S. elections. I’m here to tell you not just what I think, but about concerns shared by hundreds of experts…

Verified Voting Public Commentary: Statement to the Pennsylvania Senate State Government Committee Re: SB 1052

Verified Voting is writing today to express our opposition to Senate Bill 1052, a bill which would permit the return of ballots by electronic transmission over insecure Internet means for military voters in Pennsylvania, and to urge you to vote NO on SB 1052. Ballots sent by email are vulnerable to undetectable manipulation or tampering while in transit over the Internet. Ballots sent by fax are also vulnerable to attackers. Today most facsimiles are sent via Internet over facsimile mail programs which have the same threat profile as emailed ballots. By permitting the electronic return of voted ballots, SB 1052 will significantly damage the integrity of Pennsylvania’s elections and put the ballots of military voters at grave risk.

Department of Defense and National Institute of Standards and Technology oppose online voting.

At the start of the 21st century the promise of secure Internet voting seemed attainable; Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) in the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to develop an online voting system for military and overseas voters. The Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), an agency administered by the DOD, developed a system for deployment in 2004. After a security review the DOD cancelled the project because it could not ensure the legitimacy of votes cast over the Internet. In 2005 Congress directed the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to study the online return of voted ballots for the purpose of setting security standards so DoD and FVAP could develop a secure online voting system for military voters. NIST published numerous reports on its research, and documented several security issues that cannot be mitigated or solved with the cyber security safeguards and voting system protocols currently available. NIST concluded that until these challenges are overcome, secure Internet voting is not yet feasible.

For these reasons the Department of Defense has warned that it cannot ensure the legitimacy of ballots sent over the Internet and has stated “[the Department of Defense] does not advocate for the electronic transmission of any voted ballot, whether it be by fax, email or via the Internet.” In addition, the Federal Voting Assistance Program, in a report to Congress in 2013, stated clearly that the postal mail return of a voted ballot, coupled with the electronic transmission of a blank ballot is the “most responsible”[4. Federal Voting Assistance Program, May 2013, “2010 Electronic Voting Support Wizard (EVSW) Technology Pilot Program Report to Congress http://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Reports/evsw_report.pdf] method of absentee voting for UOCAVA voters. The overwhelming evidence that secure Internet voting is not within our grasp led Congress to repeal, in the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, the earlier directive that DoD pursue online voting for military and overseas voters.

It is not reasonable to expect the Pennsylvania Department of State should be able to develop a secure online ballot return system when the Department of Defense and the National Institute of Standards and Technology have determined secure online voting is not presently achievable.

Verified Voting Public Commentary: Comments on Colorado Rules Concerning Internet Voting

We are pleased to provide testimony and remarks regarding proposed rule changes to Colorado’s Rules Concerning Elections 8 CCR 1501-5. We appreciate the effort of your office to solicit preliminary comments from the public to inform the draft of the proposed rule changes and were happy to participate in the process. We remain in opposition to Rule 16.2.1(c). However, before addressing Rule 16.2.1(c), we would first like to address proposed new Rule 16.2.8 prohibiting Internet voting because it is inextricably linked to proposed Rule 16.2.1(c).

Public comments voiced significant objection to Internet voting. The Secretary has proposed Rule 16.2.8 which states:

New Rule 16.2.8:
16.2.8 NOTHING IN THIS RULE 16.2 PERMITS INTERNET VOTING. INTERNET VOTING MEANS A SYSTEM THAT INCLUDES REMOTE ACCESS, A VOTE THAT IS CAST DIRECTLY INTO A CENTRAL VOTE SERVER THAT TALLIES THE VOTES, AND DOES NOT REQUIRE THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTION OFFICIALS

Proposed new Rule 16.2.8 unfortunately fails to recognize that email and fax return of voted ballots (permitted and expanded in Rule 16.2.1(c)) is Internet voting and includes all of the inherent security risk of Internet voting. In fact, email (and digital fax) are considered by voting system experts at both the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission to be even less secure, [1. “E-mails are significantly easier to intercept and modify in transit than other forms of communication.” NIST IR 7551 A Threat Analysis of UOCAVA Voting Systems http://www.nist.gov/itl/vote/upload/uocava-threatanalysis-final.pdf], [2. “Email is about the least secure method of ballot delivery,” Brian Hancock The Canvass – “Internet voting, not ready for prime-time?” Feb 2013 http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/legismgt/elect/Canvass_Feb_2013_no_37.pdf] than the type of Internet voting system described in proposed Rule 16.2.8.

Verified Voting Public Commentary: Developing a Framework to Improve Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

Under Executive Order 13636 [2] (“Executive Order”), the Secretary of Commerce is tasked to direct the Director of NIST to develop a framework for reducing cyber risks to critical infrastructure (the “Cybersecurity Framework” or “Framework”). The Framework will consist of standards, methodologies, procedures and processes that align policy, business, and technological approaches to address cyber risks. The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with sector-specific agencies, will then establish a voluntary program to support the adoption of the Cybersecurity Framework by owners and operators of critical infrastructure and any other interested entities.

NIST has issued a Request for Information (RFI) in the Federal Register. It is to this RFI that our response pertains. The undersigned persons and organizations include experts on matters relating to election technology, election practices, encryption, Internet security, and/or privacy. We appreciate the opportunity to provide input on this RFI entitled “Developing a Framework to Improve Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity”.

Our response focuses on the discussion of specific practices as they pertain to elections practices and systems as part of the nation’s critical infrastructure. (Download the Full Response as a PDF)

Verified Voting Public Commentary: Verified Voting Lauds Successful Test Hack of Internet Voting Pilot

Verified Voting applauds the decision of the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics to suspend their plan to offer overseas voters the dangerous option of returning their voted ballots by a “digital vote by mail” Internet voting system. The District’s plans to continue other Internet-based ballot return methods (including email and fax) for the District’s military and civilian overseas voters still raise concerns among voting security experts. DC election officials made the decision after inviting technology experts to hack the Board’s prototype voting system during a trial period. The test pilot was apparently attacked successfully shortly after it began by a team of academic experts led by Prof. J. Alex Halderman at the University of Michigan.

The attack caused the University of Michigan fight song to be played for test voters when they completed the balloting process. Full details of the hack and its impact on submitted test ballots are expected to become available in the coming days. In addition to the Michigan team’s breach of the voting system, Verified Voting’s Board Chair Dr.David Jefferson documented a very serious vote loss problem that caused voters to inadvertently return blank ballots while believing that they had submitted complete ballots. The disenfranchising bug was noted in at least two widely used computer/browser configurations. It is possible that the same problem would affect voters trying to use email or some fax systems to return voted ballots.