National: Online voting systems raise hacking concerns | Fox News

Voting can be as easy as a click of the mouse – but is it secure? Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia now allow some form of online voting, from casting your vote online to sending an email. But after high-profile hacks like those at the Democratic National Committee, the Obama administration is looking at ways to protect online voting amid growing concerns about whether these systems are vulnerable. “There’s a vital national interest in our election process, so I do think we need to consider whether it should be considered by my department and others critical infrastructure,” Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson said.

Verified Voting Blog: Why voting systems must be as secure as the U.S. power grid

This oped was posted by Reuters on August 17, 2016.

Every American has the right to have their vote counted. The Department of Homeland Security is weighing steps to help safeguard that right. The agency is considering actions to secure the voting process against cyber-threats by designating voting systems as “critical infrastructure.” In a democracy, our voting systems are critical infrastructure like our power grids, hospital systems and nuclear power plants. The U.S. government maintains its authority based on the consent of the governed.

The revelation that hackers, possibly sponsored by Russia, illegally entered the computer system of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, as well as that of the Democratic National Committee, and monitored email activity for more than one year shows the vulnerability of the U.S. political infrastructure. Emails of members of Congress were also hacked.

There have been other serious hacking episodes. Arizona’s statewide voter registration database, for example, was recentlytaken down for more than a week so that the FBI and the state could investigate a potential breach. Arizona Secretary of State Michele Reagan called the breach an“extremely serious issue.” The FBI described the threat as “8 out of 10” on its severity scale.

The question remains: If a nation wants to influence U.S. elections, would the hackers go directly after ballots and voting systems? If that’s the case, shouldn’t protecting these systems receive the highest priority?

Canada: Elections P.E.I. working on electoral reform education campaign | The Guardian Charlottetown

The plebiscite countdown is on. Prince Edward Islanders will be going to the polls in just three months to vote on whether they would like to change P.E.I.’s voting system, and Elections P.E.I. has been touring the province to educate Islanders about the upcoming plebiscite on electoral reform. After all, there will be many new elements in this vote that many Islanders may never have experienced, including online and telephone voting as well as a ranked ballot. Paul Allen, director of communications for Elections P.E.I., says some Islanders have told him they had no idea a vote on electoral reform was scheduled for this fall. That’s why Elections P.E.I. was tasked with mounting an education campaign – to try to help Islanders understand the five different options they will be asked to choose from on the plebiscite ballot.

National: These States Are At the Greatest Risk of Having Their Voting Process Hacked | MIT Technology Review

The recent cyberattack on the Democratic National Committee has raised the specter of an Internet-based assault on the democratic process in the U.S., and has led computer security experts to call on the federal government to do more to protect the voting process from hackers.Since national elections involve some 9,000 separate jurisdictions, and they use a variety of technologies, the problem at first appears to be hopelessly complex. But there is a simple way to manage the risk of cybercrime: keep voting off the Internet. … Congress passed a law in 2009 that made it mandatory for states to electronically deliver blank ballots to voters in the military and overseas. But it said nothing about the electronic return of completed ballots. The authors of the legislation “knew there were unsolved security issues,” says Pamela Smith, president of Verified Voting, a group that advocates for the accuracy and transparency of elections. But if the law had gone so far as to issue a blanket restriction on online voting, it may not have passed. Instead, the door remained open for more states to begin offering voters the option to return their completed ballots using the Internet.

Australia: Census hacked: Australian online voting ‘dead in the water’ | news.com.au

Moves to introduce online voting in Australian elections has been dealt a “massive blow by the disastrous stuff-up” on Census night, with some commentators saying it is dead in the water. Software experts and e-voting supporters have lashed out at the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ “incompetence” and say it will cruel future government mass internet projects like online voting.
“In a single fell swoop the appalling incompetence of ABS statisticians has dealt an absolute blow … to the future of online voting,” David Glance told news.com.au. Dr Glance, who is director of the University of Western Australia’s Centre for Software Practice, said the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), had “not only damaged their own reputation and their ability to convince anyone to take seriously any of their technical claims. “They have brought into question the ability of any government agency to be able to run technology projects of this scale. “This has tipped back running elections online into the risks outweighing the benefits.” David Crowe, political correspondent for The Australian, went further, “Online voting, always a risky prospect, is certainly dead after this affair”.

Australia: NSW’s e-Voting system under fire | Computerworld

In the aftermath of the 2 July federal election, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and opposition leader Bill Shorten both indicated support for the potential use of eVoting to avoid drawn-out post-election ballot counting. However, the eVoting platform used in Australia’s most populous state — New South Wales’ iVote system — has again come under fire. The iVote system supports telephone and Internet-based voting in the state. The current version of iVote was produced by Scytl in partnership with the NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC) and used in the 2015 state election. The robustness, privacy and verification method of the system have been questioned by two university researchers, one of whom was previously instrumental in uncovering a security vulnerability in iVote.

Editorials: Paper ballots still safer than digital vote | The Courier-Mail

It took a month but we got there. Counting for the House of Reps has finished and the last seat, Herbert in north Queensland, has finally been decided. But keyboard critics are already pouncing. Not on Labor or the LNP but on the very system itself. Here we are in 2016, they say, 20 years after the internet entered our lives, and we’re still voting with pencil and paper. We wait for weeks for something a machine could do in seconds. Online voting could do away with postal and absentee votes and the lost ballots that forced a re-run of the 2013 West Australian Senate poll could be avoided. If we can enrol to vote, study and transfer money electronically, surely we can trust online ballots? No, we can’t.

Editorials: By November, Russian hackers could target voting machines | Bruce Schneier/The Washington Post

Russia was behind the hacks into the Democratic National Committee’s computer network that led to the release of thousands of internal emails just before the party’s convention began, U.S. intelligence agencies have reportedly concluded. The FBI is investigating. WikiLeaks promises there is more data to come. The political nature of this cyberattack means that Democrats and Republicans are trying to spin this as much as possible. Even so, we have to accept that someone is attacking our nation’s computer systems in an apparent attempt to influence a presidential election. This kind of cyberattack targets the very core of our democratic process. And it points to the possibility of an even worse problem in November — that our election systems and our voting machines could be vulnerable to a similar attack. If the intelligence community has indeed ascertained that Russia is to blame, our government needs to decide what to do in response. This is difficult because the attacks are politically partisan, but it is essential. If foreign governments learn that they can influence our elections with impunity, this opens the door for future manipulations, both document thefts and dumps like this one that we see and more subtle manipulations that we don’t see.

Canada: Political scientists recommend against electoral reform referendum, online voting | iPolitics

The Special Committee on Electoral Reform resumed its deliberations Monday after a two-week break, hearing from three political science professors who all opposed the option of a national referendum on electoral reform. Though Ken Carty (professor emeritus at the University of British Columbia), Brian Tanguay (professor at Wilfred Laurier University), and Nelson Wiseman (professor at the University of Toronto) expressed different views on which electoral system is the best for Canada, they were in complete agreement on the politically charged question of whether a referendum on electoral reform should be held, expressing a consensus against a national plebiscite. … All three also agreed that security concerns about online voting remain too great to try implementing it at the federal level any time soon. “The preponderance of experts are opposed to it, because…you can hack the system,” Wiseman told the committee, citing the recent hack of the Democratic National Committee as an example of a threat and e-voting “snafus” during the 2012 NDP leadership race, but adding that he could support its limited use for those with mobility issues.

National: Why Can’t We Just Vote Online? | Pacific Standard

During the 2012 American presidential election, 129 million people cast ballots, while 106 million eligible voters neglected to do so. That’s only a 54.9 percent conversion rate, not to mention the 51 million voters who weren’t registered. Meanwhile, in 2015, there were almost 172 million Americans making purchases online. Those are apples and oranges, admittedly, but the ease with which the shopping occurs only helps its proliferation. If the ultimate goal is maximizing the country’s voting turnout, shouldn’t we develop an Internet voting system? Voting from a computer at home could be far easier than waiting in long lines at polling stations or filling out mail-in forms. But can it ever happen? “For as far into the future as I can see, the answer is no,” says David Jefferson, a computer scientist in the Center for Applied Scientific Computing at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In May 2015, Jefferson examined the possibility of Internet voting in a paper called “Intractable Security Risks of Internet Voting.” For anyone who has ever owned a personal computer, the first problem is obvious: malware.
“Unless we were to re-design the Internet from the ground up, there’s not likely to be a solution to these problems.” “We’re not even remotely close to guaranteeing that there’s no malware on your computer,” Jefferson says. The malware can do whatever task it’s programmed to accomplish, from erasing votes cast to changing them. And they can do these things without leaving any trace. “The malware might erase itself a half second later, and so there might be no evidence. And that’s one of half a dozen of problems.”

Australia: Electronic voting may be faster but carries security risks | The Australian

The federal elections have mercifully come to an end, but the prolonged vote count has re-energised calls for online electronic voting. The clamour for a speedy outcome is understandable given the 21st century demand for instant gratification, but there are unintended consequences that bear careful consideration. Not only do we run the risk of introducing a whole new set of problems but also potentially undermine the very fabric of our unique democratic system. Entrepreneurs are quick to make claims that their online voting systems are safe and secure, but are unable to provide iron clad guarantees. The potential reward for the successful supplier of an online electronic voting system would be $50 million to $100m annually so there can be no doubt that pressure will mount on the Australian Electoral Commission and equivalent state bodies. … Writing in The Conversation, Vanessa Teague and Chris Culnane from the University of Melbourne and Rajeev Gore from the Australian National University identified three reasons why we shouldn’t move to an online voting system: it might not be secure, the software might have bugs and, most important, if something goes wrong we might never know.

Australia: Computer experts remain sceptical about e-voting | The New Daily

Any voter who thinks that online voting and digital counting of elections are fireproof should take note of the results of the 2012 local council elections in NSW. Following tightly-fought contests for local government positions in the NSW municipality of Griffith, researchers at the computer science departments of Australian National University and Melbourne University identified a flaw in the program code for counting the election that probably cost one candidate a seat on the local council. The flaw, which was later confirmed by the NSW Electoral Commissioner, was discovered more than three months after the council vote was declared. According to ANU’s Professor Rajeev Gore, scientific testing of the Griffith election data found that there was a 91 per cent chance that the losing candidate, Rina Mercuri, would have won if the computer error had not occurred. The likely counting errors cast serious doubt on the legitimacy of the Griffith election.

Australia: Electronic voting has advantages but remains vulnerable to security, software problems | ABC

They may be political rivals but Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Opposition Leader Bill Shorten can agree on one issue: electronic voting. “I’ve been an advocate for electronic voting for a long time. This is something we must look at,” Mr Turnbull said. Mr Shorten agreed, saying: “It’s long overdue to look at electronic voting in this county”. … But introducing e-voting would not as easy as it sounds. Dr Vanessa Teague from Melbourne University said there were two main ways to conduct electronic voting: over the internet via a voter’s device at home, or via a computer at the polling station. She said neither system was foolproof and both were vulnerable to security and software problems. “[These could] affect the election results in a way that we wouldn’t necessarily know,” Dr Teague said.

Editorials: Why the rush? In defence of Australia’s slow election count | Ben Raue/The Guardian

Bill Shorten has expressed interest in moving to electronic voting to prevent delays in future Australian election results. Malcolm Turnbull agrees with this sentiment. Electronic voting would not actually speed up a very close result, and it carries the risk of undermining trust in our electoral system. Electronic voting in most cases is unnecessary, expensive and impractical. It also has numerous problems that shouldn’t be underestimated. Firstly, any voting system needs to be anonymous, secure and transparent – and this is difficult to do using an electronic system. There are numerous objections to the anonymity, security and transparency of electronic voting (in particular, voting over the internet) on technical grounds that I won’t go into here. The majority of voters cast a vote at a local polling place on election day. This system works pretty well – votes are counted quickly and the system is well understood. It would come at a tremendous cost to set up electronic voting facilities in every school and church hall across the country for a single day of voting. It would be more practical to introduce electronic pre-poll voting at booths in capital cities, as currently happens for Australian Capital Territory elections and New Zealand elections, but these votes are already counted on election night, so this wouldn’t do much to speed up a result.

Australia: Cyber sector adamant e-voting is too costly and complex | Financial Review

Start-up entrepreneurs, tech industry leaders and politicians are at loggerheads with the cyber security sector, which remains adamant that electronic voting is too costly and complex. The debate has erupted in response to the recent election saga, where it has taken the Australian Electoral Commission more than a week to finish counting the votes. Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Opposition leader Bill Shorten joined the debate on Sunday, both mentioning the need to find an e-voting solution in their victory and concession speeches, respectively. Senior security analyst at cyber security firm Checkpoint, Raymond Schippers, told The Australian Financial Review it would be too difficult to adequately secure an e-voting system. “The amount of attacks over the internet is insane. In an instant someone could compromise 10,000 computers. And without the voter ever knowing, someone could change their vote and no one would ever be able to confirm it was changed,” he said.

Editorials: E-voting is still the wrong answer to the wrong question | Stilgherrian/ZDNet

Here we go again. There’s been an election in Australia, so once more, with all the regularity of a cuckoo clock, politicians and pundits alike are proposing that electronic voting is the answer. So, here we go again, explaining why it’s a bad idea. First, if e-voting is the answer, what is the actual question? Here’s what troubles people this time. … Broadly speaking, there’s two kinds of e-voting: voting over the internet, and voting in person at polling stations where votes are recorded on computers rather than paper ballots. Whichever kind of e-voting we’re talking about, it has to solve a conundrum. How do we provide the complete transparency of process needed to eliminate fraud, while still maintaining the secrecy of individuals’ votes? As I wrote in 2011, transparency is the tricky bit. “Our paper voting system is easy to understand. Anyone with working eyesight and who can read and count can scrutineer the process. No special skills are required,” I wrote.

National: Cyber Vulnerabilities Threaten 2016 Election | Risk & Insurance

Nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of registered voters believe the 2016 presidential campaign will be compromised by a cyber breach in some way, according to a poll conducted by data security firm PKWARE and Wakefield Research. Their concerns are not unwarranted; at a time when breaches and data theft make headlines on a regular basis, much of the voting process remains unprotected. “There is a lot of vulnerability in paperless voting systems, whether they are direct reporting electronic machines, or email return ballots,” said Pamela Smith, president of Verified Voting, a nonprofit organization that advocates for accuracy, transparency and verifiability of elections. Most polling places use paper ballots that are tabulated by a scanner. Even if the scanner goes haywire, there is a paper record of voters’ intent and officials can take a manual count. In fully paperless systems, no such backup exists. “In a situation like that, there’s no way to demonstrate that the software is working properly. If something seems amiss or there is an unexpected outcome, you really wouldn’t have a way to go back and correct it because you don’t have an independent record of voter intent,” Smith said. Electronic systems, then, offer a prime target for hackers looking to influence elections.

Editorials: Why Internet Voting Is a Nonstarter | Avi Rubin/JHU Engineering Magazine

I began my college studies in computer science in 1985, and I watched as the Internet transformed the world over the last 25 years. As a computer scientist, I have an acute appreciation for the benefits of our global, interconnected network. I love the Internet. By all accounts, I am an early adopter. I was the first of all my friends with a cellphone and a mobile email reading device. I was the first to buy an Apple Newton; I hacked my own TiVo when the product was first introduced, and I use a smart doorbell and thermostat at home. I embrace technology and progress. Let’s put it all online. Find a way to automate this. Give me a high-tech way to do that. I do online banking, store my medical records in the cloud, and use wireless payments at the mall. My car, a 2013 Tesla, has its own Internet connection, and I navigate my boat with my iPad. So why am I stuck in the Dark Ages when it comes to voting? Why do I believe in paper ballots instead of direct-recording electronic voting machines? And why do I believe that we will not be able to securely vote on the Internet in the foreseeable future?

Malta: Why electronic voting is seen as a ‘difficult journey’ | Times of Malta

Evidently dealing with a sacred cow, Chief Electoral Commissioner Joseph Church believes that every step in the digital transformation of elections in Malta “is a journey that includes difficult, yet not impossible, tasks”. A firm believer in the opportunities offered by the new technology to “improve the electoral process”, Mr Church, however, rules out a big bang approach. “I am conscious that any development has to take place within a mature debate with political parties. The dialogue among all stakeholders, addressing concerns and ideas in an open and transparent process, will help avoid contentions on the digital transformation of elections in Malta.” One might question the need to change Malta’s accepted voting system, which has served the county well for many years. The main reason motivating other countries to embark on an IT transformation of their electoral systems is improving turnout. However, it is very difficult to improve the turnout at a Maltese general election, as the lowest since Independence was 93 per cent.

National: Cybersecurity Experts Go to Washington | BU Today

Officially, it was a cybersecurity briefing on Capitol Hill hosted by Jean Morrison, Boston University provost, and the Congressional Cybersecurity Caucus, but it felt a little like a college freshman-level computer science seminar. Sharon Goldberg, a College of Arts & Sciences associate professor of computer science, was explaining some of the deep insecurities built into the internet, and why they matter. Her students were a group of Congressional aides and interns and other Hill staffers. They had crowded into a room in the Cannon House Office Building recently on their lunch hour and were taking copious notes so they could better inform policymakers, who are scrambling these days to catch up with technical reality. “The internet was designed several decades ago as a network for universities, for graduate students to send each other emails, to do scientific computing—not for what it’s doing today,” said Goldberg, one of three cybersecurity experts who addressed the briefing. It was a time, she added, “when basically everyone on the internet believed they could all trust each other because they were all graduate students playing with computers.”

Editorials: Electronic voting may be risky, but what about vote counting? | Robert Merkel/The Conversation

Several advantages of online voting were identified in a recent post by Conversation columnist and software researcher David Glance who backed the introduction of such a scheme in Australia. He is correct that an online voting system would be faster, more convenient and have fewer accidental informal votes. It would also reduce the donkey vote problem (though the “donkey vote” bias can also be dealt with by the use of Robson rotation on printed ballots). But in my view he dismisses the very real risks not only of actual election tampering, but something equally important – the confidence that Australian elections aren’t being tampered with. A vote-counting system not only needs to be secure against threats to its integrity, it needs to be seen to be secure against such threats. The right technologies, deployed in the right way, can assist with speeding up vote counts without putting the integrity of our voting system at risk. The place for that technology is not as a replacement for the paper ballot.

Canada: Dates and rules set for electoral reform vote in P.E.I. | The Charlottetown Guardian

For the first time ever, Prince Edward Islanders will have the option to vote online, by telephone or by traditional paper ballot in the upcoming plebiscite on electoral reform. The dates and rules for the plebiscite have been set and approved by executive council. Voting will be held over a 10-day period, from noon on Saturday, Oct. 29 until 7 p.m. Monday Nov. 7. Those who choose to vote online or by telephone can do so within this voting period. Every eligible voter will be issued a PIN (personal identification number) to use for Internet or telephone ballots.

Norway: Governments should consider the consequences when they decide whether to adopt Internet voting | Democratic Audit

The secret ballot is largely undisputed as a democratic principle. What this principle means in practice, however, may be contested when voting takes place outside the polling station in a so-called uncontrolled environment, i.e., remote voting including Internet voting, postal voting and telephone voting. Remote voting transfers the responsibility for vote secrecy from the authorities to the voters. The popular understanding of the principle of the secret ballot, therefore, becomes crucial, because this may influence whether voters actually keep their vote secret. The secrecy of the vote has two aspects. First, it requires that voters are able to cast their votes in private, unobserved by anyone. Second, it requires that no one is able to break the anonymity of the vote at a later stage. Even though both aspects are important, we focus on the former. Voter attitudes towards the privacy aspect have received little attention in the literature on remote voting. The secrecy of the vote is usually taken for granted, and questions about this issue are therefore rarely asked in surveys.

Australia: Election explainer: why can’t Australians vote online? | The Conversation

In 2015, more than 280,000 votes were received in the New South Wales election from a personal computer or mobile phone. This was the largest-ever binding election to use online voting. But federally, the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters has ruled out allowing Australians to cast their vote online, arguing it risks “catastrophically compromising our electoral integrity”. Despite years of research, nobody knows how to provide evidence of an accurate result while keeping individual online votes private. Internet voting is similar to online banking, except you’re not sent a receipt saying “this is how you voted” because then you could be coerced or bribed. Your vote should be private, even from the electoral commission.

Australia: Let us test voting code, say academics | Associated Press

Doubts about the accuracy of the Senate vote count remain until the Australian Electoral Commission agrees to publicly release the computer code it uses. That’s the view of the Australian Greens and academics who have studied vote-counting software errors. University of Melbourne researchers recomputed the NSW local government election results from 2012, finding two errors in counting – one of which showed a candidate’s chances of election significantly being reduced. The NSW Electoral Commission on Tuesday announced it had corrected the software – originally bought from the AEC – following the study by researchers Andrew Conway and Vanessa Teague. But it was only because the NSWEC published its full preference data and coding that the errors were identified.

National: Online voting is a cybersecurity nightmare | The Daily Dot

It’s easy to get excited about internet voting. Social media, Skype, online banking—these types of tools and services have expanded our voices, connected us the world over, and added convenience and efficiency to our lives. Who wouldn’t want to see elections benefit from these kinds of advances? But internet voting isn’t online banking or video calling or…

National: ​David Dill: Why Online Voting Is a Danger to Democracy | Stanford Report

If, like a growing number of people, you’re willing to trust the Internet to safeguard your finances, shepherd your love life, and maybe even steer your car, being able to cast your vote online might seem like a logical, perhaps overdue, step. No more taking time out of your workday to travel to a polling place only to stand in a long line. Instead, as easily as hailing a ride, you could pull out your phone, cast your vote, and go along with your day. Sounds great, right? Absolutely not, says Stanford computer science professor David Dill. In fact, online voting is such a dangerous idea that computer scientists and security experts are nearly unanimous in opposition to it. Dill first got involved in the debate around electronic voting in 2003, when he organized a group of computer scientists to voice concerns over the risks associated with the touchscreen voting machines that many districts considered implementing after the 2000 election. Since then, paperless touchscreen voting machines have all but died out, partly as a result of public awareness campaigns by the Verified Voting Foundation, which Dill founded to help safeguard local, state, and federal elections. But a new front has opened around the prospect of Internet voting, as evidenced by recent ballot initiatives proposed in California and other efforts to push toward online voting. Here, Dill discusses the risks of Internet voting, the challenge of educating an increasingly tech-comfortable public, and why paper is still the best way to cast a vote.

Editorials: Pennsylvania bill to permit internet voting for military, overseas travelers an invitation to hackers | Daniel Lopresti/The Morning Call

The Pennsylvania Legislature is considering a bill, sponsored by Sen. Pat Stefano, that would permit military and overseas voters to transmit voted ballots over the internet. Despite good intentions, SB 1052 would jeopardize the vote and voice of our troops and compromise the integrity of Pennsylvania elections by exposing them to attacks from hackers operating…

United Kingdom: Voter Website Crash Shows Why Online Voting is a Pipe Dream For Now | Inverse

The U.K. government’s website for voter registration crashed Tuesday night, sparking panic that citizens may miss out on casting their ballots. Voters scrambled to submit their application forms before the midnight deadline, in order to participate in a June 23 referendum on whether to leave the European Union. A sudden surge in traffic caused the service to collapse, raising questions about whether online democracy is really ready for primetime. Politicians across the spectrum are now calling for a deadline extension after the fiasco. Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the center-left Labour Party, said on Twitter that the deadline has to be extended, given the circumstances. Corbyn was joined by Tim Farron, leader of the Liberal Democrats, and Nigel Farage, whose right-wing U.K. Independence Party is campaigning for a leave vote. The site was only used to register voters, rather than to actually count votes in an election, but it does highlight some issues that may arise if democracies switched to an online ballot box. What happens if the site crashes near the deadline? Would the cut-off point get extended? If certain groups were seen as disenfranchised, like Firefox users who couldn’t get the site to display, would this draw into question the result’s legitimacy?

National: Online voting would be a ‘complete disaster’ according to Stanford Computer Scientist | Examiner

Imagine the convenience of being able to cast a vote from the comfort of a couch, coffee shop, library or a toilet if you’re truly trying to capture the spirit of the 2016 election cycle. Online voting may seem like a no-brainer given myriad of ways one can connect to the internet. However, according to David Dill, a computer scientist from Stanford, it would be a ‘complete disaster.’ It’s not just him that isn’t fond of the idea of putting the future of our country into computer, but security experts as well. “Computers are very complicated things and there’s no way with any reasonable amount of resources that you can guarantee that the software and hardware are bug-free and that they haven’t been maliciously attacked,” Dill said in an interview. “The problems are growing in complexity faster than the methods to keep up with them. From that perspective, looking at a system that relies on the perfectibility of computers is a really bad idea.”