The Voting News Daily: Glitches in IN,NC,OH,TX. Butler OH BoE website attacked. Internet voting risks

Sending voted ballots over the public Internet “is in a security class by itself,” …and these ballots are vulnerable to attacks from a wide range of individuals, organizations, and even governments.” ~ Verified Voting Comments to EAC on i-voting pilots…Arizona mailer gives 27K voters wrong polling place… Voting machine probs in NC, IN, OH, TX…

Verified Voting Blog: Military and Overseas Voting Update

For members of the military, their families, and other United States citizens living overseas, voting has always presented unique challenges. Some of these problems include reliable delivery of blank ballots to the voters, secure and timely return of voted ballots, and authenticating that ballots were completed and returned by the same person they were sent to. According to an EAC study, Voting from Abroad: A Survey Of UOCAVA Voters:

There are no reliable data available on the number of [military and overseas] voters dispersed around the globe; some estimates hover around 4 million. Active-duty military are estimated at 1.5 million and family of military another 1.5 million.

In 1986 and again in 2009, Congress passed laws looking to improve access to voting for military and overseas voters. And today, as communication technologies like fax and email have become available, states are moving forward with plans for electronic transmission and receipt of ballots, all too often without sufficient regard for the privacy and security issues involved.

Verified Voting Blog: Verified Voting Comments to EAC on Internet Voting Pilots

With many states already deploying a form of Internet voting, email return of voted ballots (see map), it is important that requirements for remote voting systems and the pilot programs that test them reflect the highest standards for security. On April 30, 2010, Verified Voting submitted comments to the EAC on proposed testing requirements for military and overseas voting pilot programs that use remote technologies such as Internet Voting. In a letter to the EAC, president Pam Smith said that the comments focused on “the broad outlines of the pilot program and core precepts to which we believe any pilots should adhere.” Sending voted ballots over the public Internet “is in a security class by itself,” the letter noted, and these ballots are vulnerable to attacks from a wide range of individuals, organizations, and even governments. “Voting systems for UOCAVA voters should not be held to a higher security standard than domestic absentee voting,” the letter said, “nor should UOCAVA voters be required to use a system that is less secure than those used by voters back home.”

Verified Voting Blog: California Legislation Calls for First Risk-Limiting Pilot Audits

Over the past year, election auditing experts, including Verified Voting staff, have been working with California Secretary of State Debra Bowen’s office toward improving California’s audits. Now legislation authorizing the Secretary of State to work with a minimum of five volunteer counties to conduct pilot risk-limiting audits in 2011 is making good progress. The Secretary…

Verified Voting Blog: Efficient Auditing of Election Results

On March 27 and 28, 2010, Verified Voting and Common Cause sponsored a meeting of in Washington, D.C. to share experiences and ideas for improving post-election audits. The participants included election officials, statisticians, computer and political scientists, election integrity advocates, and voting system vendor technical staff. This meeting marked the first time that diverse stakeholders, including voting systems vendors, met together for the explicit purpose of identifying the potential benefits and challenges of using small batches of ballots (i.e., smaller than precincts — down to and including individual ballot records) to make audits more effective and efficient.