Voting Blogs: Ten ways to make voting machines cheat with plausible deniability | Andrew Appel/Freedom to Tinker
Voting machines can be hacked; risk-limiting audits of paper ballots can detect incorrect outcomes, whether from hacked voting machines or programming inaccuracies; recounts of paper ballots can correct those outcomes; but some methods for producing paper ballots are more auditable and recountable than others.
A now-standard principle of computer-counted public elections is, use a voter-verified paper ballot, so that in case the voting machine cheats in counting the votes, the human doing an audit or recount can see the paper that the voter marked. Why would the voting machine cheat? Well, they’re computers, and any computer may have security vulnerabilities that permits an attacker to modify or replace its software. We must presume that any voting machine might, at any time, be under the complete control of an attacker, an election thief.Full Article: Ten ways to make voting machines cheat with plausible deniability.