People have trouble prioritizing risk. For example, you often hear about the threat of voter fraud, when all evidence suggests that the risks of such fraud are inconsequential. In truth, hacked voting machines are much more likely to affect an election’s outcome. Why would an election fraudster try to herd a flock of criminal participants to the polls when one mildly talented hacker could cause far more trouble? On a state-by-state level, most presidential elections are decided by many thousands of votes. For example, in 2012, Barack Obama beat Mitt Romney by more than 166,000 votes in the swing state of Ohio. Even in the 2000 election, the closest presidential contest ever, what sort of Houdini could have marshaled the miscreants necessary to cast a few hundred fake votes to tip the balance without getting caught? A hack of a single voting machine could accomplish the same objective.
… I know of no independent computer security researcher with voting machine expertise who will tell you that computerized-voting is safe as it stands — or recommends moving to internet-based voting. Read Bruce Schneier’s latest NSFW rant to get his take on the topic.
Lots of other organizations, such Verified Voting, are working hard to safeguard our current computerized voting experience. Verified Voting even lets you find out which voting computer or machine your voting precinct uses.
All voting computer experts agree that verified paper audit systems must be maintained to audit and spot-check a voter’s intent. Unfortunately, one quarter of our states don’t require paper trails — and only 26 require post-election auditing verification.
Full Article: Voting machines are still too easy to hack | InfoWorld.